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" Ihe v/ay to learn democracy is by
applying it,"
General Joseph T, LxKarney
Ame r i can I-i 1 i tary Governpr
of Gernany

IK H-iODUC TIOK
r
1.
During the long years of Vvorld vVar II, much plain nonsense
and much intelligent thinking rer^ardin:;: the serious problem of
German political, social, and intellectual "reeducation" cap-
tured the minds of Americans in every sector of the United
States. On the one hand, there were scores of r^randiose,
sugary schem.es to "reeducate" the misled Germans wi tn patience
and dilif:;ence, in order to lead them to the enjoyment of the
panacea of enli.-htened democracy. On the other hand, there
v/ere num.erous schem^es to eradicate everything relating to Ger-
many's past and to plunge the bleeding nation into a nevi/ credo
designed to produce a penitent, definitely reformed Germany.
Between these t\YO extremes, triere v/ere , of course, thousands of
more mxoderate plans.
ViHiat is. American Military Governm.ent ' s long-awaited solu-
tion to the problem of reorienting the German miind? Does the
solution tend to be harsh and ruthless, or does it tend to be
gentle and even innocuous? Is there, in fact, a concrete
¥/orking plan at all?
Uj problem, then, is to ascertain v/hat American I.ilitary
Government in its first three years of operation has accom.-
plished in regard to the "reeducation" of the German nation.
The success of the first three years is important to m.easure,
because it v/ill be an excellent criterion by vihlch the possi-
bilities of additional, more im.portant successes for the future
may be estimated. In order to define the problem more
r4
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precisel^^, i have decided, to limit my investigations to v/hat I
consider the most important phases of tlie problem; namely,
education, the political parties, the press, and youth, A de-
tailed investigation of these four facets of G-erman life will
indicate very coF.pletely what Military Government has accom-
plished in Germany and what re-'-ains to be done. It is undoubt-
edly true that other phases of Gsrman life iiipinj^e on this
general problem of "reeducation," but there should be no
grounds for controversy in the statement that education, the
political parties, the press, sjnA youth lie closest to the
core of "reeducation."
My sources of information have been many and varied. A
basic source of m.aterial has been the Aionthly Report of the
Military Governor, U.S. Zone . Because the m.ilitary is inter-
ested in general over-all appraisals, in simple reports of per-
form.ance rather than weighted, profound analyses, an uncritical
acceptance of its tabulations and observations without a p;reat
deal of careful evaluation v/ould result in an exceedingly false
picture of v/hat is happening in Germany today. Books by Harold
Zink, Gustav Stolper, Julian Bach, and m.any others, as well as
articles by num.ercus Military Governj::snt officials, educators,
political scientists, and sociologists, have assisted me to be-
come far more objective than I otherwise should have been.
Discussions v;ith people v/ho were familiar v/ith Germian^/ in her
pre-occupation days and with other people ivho have witnessed
(
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and studied her in her present occupation throes have perrorr.od
the invaluable function of making possible a more rounded, a
more pragmatic study of the process of "reeducation."
The plan, then, is to utilize militarj-^ facts and figures
as a superficial outer shell, within which subjective impres-
sions and objective data from numerous critical sources will be
correlated in an attempt to measure current G-erman democratic
attainments, hov/ever insi'r;nificant, and also future democratic
aspirations, hov/ever optimistic and conditional upon favorable
factors.
rr
A BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF
AivJiRICAIi IdlLITARY GOVSRNISNT IN G-ERMNY

1.
Before ^oin:;: on to study and interprst the v/ork of x^ri.eri-
can x^ilitary C-overniiient in its zone in Germany in its attempt
to reeducate for democracy, it is necessary to visualize what
Anerican Lilitary Crovern-ient is. During the v/ar a Military
Governr'-en t section v/as set up in the Office of the Provost
harshal-General and -tlie Civil Affairs Division in the v/ar De-
partment, A school for hi-her officers in rj^ilitary government
v/as inaurmrated in 19l]-2 at the University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia, Other prospective civil affairs
officers were sent to Fort Custer, r.ichigan, for one-^onth
training before proceeding; to Civil Afft.irs 'Iraining Schools
(CAIS) at leading American colleges for a tv;o-month tevu before
going overseas or to replacement centers to av/ait assignment.
Enlisted men received somewhat the same college-l^vel military
government training. Tae idea of training men especially for
occupation v;ork was excellent; hov/ever there was an enormous
lack of up-to-date maps and materials on v;hich to base the in-
struction. Because the knowledge i^rparted by the in^^ true tors
was general, the rank and file of the officers found them.selves
"woefully lacking in their knowledge of German ins ti tiitions
,
culture, and psychology upon arrival in Germany,"-^
Early in Ip'-P-!- a German Country Unit was established in Eng
land with an initial strengtii of 1^0 Am.erican and British
officers. It was assumed at that time that military government
1, Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany
,
(New
York, 191+7), p, 11. Ivluch of this history taken from tiiis book.
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would be a joint Ainerican- ritish venture. At first the German
Country Unit acted as a special staff of Supreme Headquarters;
then it becarie a military ^^overnrient unit under the European
Affairs Division (EGAD). Ihc plan v/as to make the unit similar
to the actual Crernan Government's administrative organization^
so that American and British personnel could step into the
vaca-ted German ministries as scon as the v/ar was over. This
unit had to operate in the dark, because there v/ere no declara-
tions of policy forthcoming from. London or Washington.
In the summer of 19kh- "the Am.erican and '^^ritish Governments
decided to handle miilitary r-overnment affairs on a national
basis. lb implement this new decision, a United States C'roup,
Control Council for Germ^any was organized with I'^O officers and
250 enlisted men, Ihe conclusion of hostilities forced a rapid
growth on this unit so that within a short tim.e 2000 officers
and [-000 enlisted men were assi./^ned to the unit. By midsumm.er
of 19''-i-5j "the unit moved from Eochst near U'rankfurt to Berlin.
Ihe organization re:;ponsible for planninr and control was
called the United States x''orces, European 'iheater (BSBET),
whereas the United States Group, Control Council becam.e the
Office for Military Government, Bnited States Zone (OI'GUS),
which was imiinediately under the American deputy military
governor. Ihe eastern district of ^'ilitary Government was
placed under G-i> of the Ihird -irmy,and the western division
was placed under G-5 of the Seventh Army. The deactivation of
€
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the Hiird Amy forced G-5 oi" that unit to turn responsibility
for military v.overnrnent affairs to the I.lilitary Government unit
in that area.
Hie iiilitary Goverr^nent units themselves v/ere out of pro-
portion in regard to the jobs before them. For instance, the
legal and financial divisions had far too many officers and
men, v/hereas the educational, public welfare, and public safety
units v/ere understaffed to such an e::tent that in the summer of
I9I1.6 there v/as still only one educational officor for every
270,000 Germans in the American Zone.
Unfortunate 13^, too, the civil affairs officers were giwen
a great deal of combat tactical training-, but little peace-
time occupation training; therefore these officers be^an to
feel that one or two Fxonths after the end of hostilities their
work was accomplished. Actually, however, in a ver^^ real
sense^ their v;ork was just beginnin.:^. When the problems of
reactivating German political parties, labor unions, or
cultural groups presented them^selves, a large number of these
supposedly trained officers did not know what to do. General
Patton in Bavaria had such a s'vall amount of respect for his
Military Government personnel that he Uc-ually assigned tacti-
cal officers to do I-ilitary Government chores and to hasten
the flirht into chaos.
In addition to the insufficiencies of I/'ilitary Government
officers, tliere was another factor that radically restricted
rc
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the chance of ^.^ilitary ^overnient to do a satisfactory job.
As soon as hostilities ceased in the Asiatic 'iheater, many of
the hifher officers requested as3i£;nrient to j^ilitary Government
to avoid reassi^rn'-ient to and demotion in the United States.
Biese hif'h-ranking officers assumed the comriands that civil
affairs officers had been exercising, and the result of the
substitution could never be anything but more and costlier mis-
takes. A vast number of trained enlisted men v/ere lost some-
where betv/een the colleges and the European Iheater. Even in
Washington there ivas confusion in I.'illtary Government, because
the Civil Affairs Division looked to the War Departm.ent for its
operating procedures and to the State Department for its
policies
.
American i:ilitary Government maintained that from the
first it had not planned to operate the German Government
directly, because that undertaking, v.'-ould require the services
of far too many men. ViTnether that was the reason or whether
the untov/ard demobilization forced j.-ilitary Government's hand,
responsibility v/as gradually being turned over to the ^'ermans
by the fall of ly'hS * As the German governments began to func-
tion more efficiently, military detachments were removed from
the rural counties and smaller cities to oe replaced by sm.all
liaison and security teams in'^ tailed in key locations, V/ithin
I.Illitary Government itself, civilians composed two-thirds of
the staff by August, 19^1-''^, according:; to General Clay.
c
Berlin, occupied by the Pov/ers jointly, is -overned
by an Allied Control Council, v/hich is also supreme in riermany
itself; hov/ever since its decisions require unanimity, its
perforinance record has' been lii'iiited in scope. Hie Council it-
self consists of the ranking representative of each Ally; the
Coordinating; Conirai ttee , the second echelon of power, consists
of the deputy military t;:overnor of each zone; and the third
echelon of power, the Secretariat, does the housekeeping
chores, maintains the records, and prepares the agenda, assist-
ed by tv/elve directorates of -nilitary, naval, air, and econorait
matters, political affp.irs, finance, legal affairs, manpower,
internal affairs, communications, prisoner of war and displacet
persons division, and reparations. 'ihese directorates obtain
their representatives from the respective Military Government
headquarters of the various powers. heedless to say, such com-
plicated government in \7hich one veto kills a m.easure has been
somev/hat successful in routine matters, but has failed conspic-
uously and often v/hen important decisions involving high-level
policy are to be m.ade.
fc
THS REACTIVATION OP POLITICAL PARTIES
c
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The line of attack Americar Military Government officeps
were to follow in G-errr.an political affairs was outlined for
General :^isenliov/er in April, > in the "Directive to Com-
mander-in-Chief of U, 3. yorces of Occupation I-ier-^ardin,;;;' Kili^r
tary Crovernraent in Ger; .any" ('JCS IO67') :
1. 3. c. "Bie administration of affairs in Germany
shall be directed towards the decentrali-
zation of the political and administrative
structure and the development of local re-
sponsibility, lb this end you v/ill encour-
age autonom.y in re,r;ional, local and munici-
pal agencies of Germ.an administration...
b. "It should be brought home to the Germans
that Germany's ruthless warfare and the
fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed
the Germ.an economy and made chaos and suf-
fering inevitable and that the Germans
cannot escape responsibility for what they
have brou^r^ht upon themselves.
c. "Germany will not be occupied for the pur-
pose of liberation but as a definite enemy
nation. Your aim is not oppression but to
occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing
certain important Allied ob jec tive s . . .You
v/ill strongly discourage fraternization
with the German ofx*icials and population.
9. 9» a. "Ilo political activities of any kind shall
be countenanced unless authorized by you.
You v/ill assure that your military ,r;;overn-
m.ent has not become corimittod to any poli-
tical group."!
Tbe famous Potsdam Declaration had several things to say
about future political affairs in Germ.any as follows:
"It is not the intention of the Allies to
destroy or enslave the German people. It
is the intention of the Allies that the
German people_be_2lven_ the_opportuni ty to
1. Kojo Kolborn, American liilitary Government
,
Infantry Jour-
nal Pre ss ( Vi/ashin,'^"tQn . 19lj.7J. ApDendix. pp. i6 p-i^'^it
c
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prepare for the eventual reconstruction of
their life on a dei^iOcratic and peaceful
basis
.
Ill Q. "Administration of affairs in Germany
should be directed towards the decentrali-
zation of the political structure and the
devslopnent of local responsibility'-. lb
this end:
(i) "Local self -^overniTi.ent should be restored
throur;-hout Cxormany on democratic principles
and in particular throu'rh elective councils
as rapidl^r as is consistent with military
security and the purposes of the military
occupation;
(ii) "All democratic parties with riphts of as-
sembly and of public discussion shall be al-
lov/ed and encouraged th_rouphout Germany;
(iii) "Representatives and elective principles
shall be introduced into regional, provin-
cial and state (land) administration as
rapidly as m.ay be justified by the success-
ful application of these principles in local
self-government;
(iv) "r'or the tim.e oeing no central German gov-
ernm.ent shall be established. No tv.'i ths tan*^-
ing this, hoY/ever, certain essential central
German adm.inis trative departments, headed by
state secretaries, shall be established,
particularly in the fields of finance, trans-
port, comraunications
,
foreipn trade and in-
dustry. Such departments v/ill act under the
direction of the Control Council.
10. "Subject to the necessity of maintaining
military security, freedom of speech, press,
and relir^ion shall be permitted, and reli-
gious institutions shall be respected. Sub-
ject likewise to the maintenance of iiilitai-'y
security, the formation of free trade unions
shall be permitted." 2
This machir.^ry set up 3_'t_Fc tsdam_has_;^rcve d to be excellent
2, Occupation of Germany, Policy and Progress , the Department
of State, Publication 2783, 19k-7, PP. 177-173.
c
as far as barr;alnin^r; and conpromise are concerned, but it has
disc our a'^e d ac c omp 1 i shrie n t s
.
Vfiien the American i-ilit::ir7 Governnent forces moved into
control of Germany after the cessation of hostilities, their
first step was to suspend all activity, v/hether political, in-
formational, or educational. To prevent Am.erican I.'ilitary
Government from steppin," into fairly v/ell-cons ti tu ted .^"overn-
mental -adm.inis trations , the i.azis had divided reco-'.'^ds and offi-
cials so that one-half of the administrators and their records
went southland the oiliers took their records north, liarold
Zink reports that Central Qovernm.ent records v/ere found all
over Germany, but most of the officials themselves remained in
hiding. Probably never in history had there been such a com-
plete disin te.r;;ration of a nation and its p;overn.ment.
There v/as for several months a vast political vacuum which
no one v/as able to fill, Military Goverrmisnt ' s policj was to
select reasonably acceptable Germans to be chief administra-
tors, often as a result of several consultations with leading
local clergymen, Ihe Office of Strategic Services and Counter-
intelligence were supposed to supply ^Military Governjment with
lists of acceptable Gormxans, but did not have tim.e or means to
do so, Thie clergymen, for their part, often recomc-ended kazis.
Another difficulty v/as that the acceptable Germ.ans were also
inexperienced Germans (as far as administration was concerned);
therefore there was a refusal to make even day-to-day, routine
€4
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decisions, thus forcing; i'ilitary C-overnii^ent to intrude on pure-
ly personal Gerinan affairs. For the Gerr-ian officials, it must
j
be admitted that i'ilitary Government often entrusted to local
German officials responsibilities that never cculd be handled
on a local level.
By late I/.ay of 19li-5> som_e i^litery Government detachments
were beginnin,-]- to set up regional and local governments, even
thou -^h they were supposed to limit themselves to local adminis-
trative functions. Ihe Am-erican policy v/as to reconstruct
the Germ.an units ultimately in a federal system, not just to
set up units in a hit-or-m.iss fashion. In order to institute
wholly nev.- governvients
,
L;ilitary Govemm.ent had to find m.en
who were imaginative, efficient, capable of assum.ing leadership,
reliable; however it found that these qualities v/ere exceeding-
ly uncomm.on after the r.azi regime's collapse,
I.'ilitajry Government was given Bavaria, Baden, WueVttemberg,
and Hesse to adm.inister. Because Bavaria remained a geographi-
cal unit, it was the easiest for i ilitary Government to
!
handle administratively, if not politically. At one time
Bavaria's government, v/ith the blessin;-:s of the American auth-
orities, was entrusted to a clique with close ties with the
Nazis and the m.ili taris ts . General Eisenliower had to order
the eviction of the whole German adm.inis trfition. Since
existing political, economic, cultural, and geographical
]
boundaries were com-plo tel3'- ignored, the task of managing the

11.
other German states v/as imr.ieasurably more difficult. For in-
stance, Wuerifetemberr, vvas divided into two sections: r'rance
was given mu.ch of the western half; the United States received
the capital, Stuttgart, v/ithout the hinterland to feed it,
Hesse was butchered in the same illogical manner; as v/as
Baden, of v/hich the southern part was given to I'rance and
the northern part to ilie united States. Several of the mili-
tary leaders set up small kingdoms of tneir ov/n and competed
with one another for territory and pov/cr.
In the first fev/ months of the occupation, Liilitary gov-
ernment concerned itself mainly v>rith repairing; water mains,
clear inr: sono of the less devastated buildings, providinr^ for
the resumption of street car service, etc., because these
kinds of jobs the American military -len understood, whereas
many of tliem feared the political, social, and economic takks
which required an understanding^ of -Germany and her problem.s.
|i
Industry received little encouragement, except for a few plants'
which produced v/ar materials for use af=:;ainst the Japanese.
j
In the summer of lol\.^l
,
only about 2-3"^ of the Germ.an Indus tr^r I
was allowed to resume operations.
3
Food soon became an acute problem. The daily food ration
!
was set at between pCO and 1100 calories a day, though 2000
|
calories are considered an absolute minimum to sustain life. Ij
The loss of Germany's breadbasket to Poland, combined with
poor transportation,, a lack of seeds j_ worn out machinery,
3, Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 113,
c
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has kept the German people is a constant food crisis Every-
day p?:^oblems soon became so pressing that Jvilitary (^overniTient
found little time for plarning the long-run and perplexing
questions of education, politics, youth, reorientation, and
denazification.
To further complicate Military Government's attempts to
solve its pressln:^ problem.s was the lack of coordination be-
tween the different army headquarters and their field units.
At this tim.e American hilitary Government was presented
with a golden opportunity to m.arshal strength against the un-
desirable I'azis and to attract support from, the anti-Kazi or
non-hazi elements in a giant clean-up crusade. In the vt'ake
of the retreating and later defeated German armies. Working
Corar:iittees offered their services to fight Nazism., '-^elp in the
reeducation of the Germans for peace and democratic living,
and provide food for the starving and hom.es for the homeless.
Among those ivho volunteered to assist ralitary Goverm-nent v;ere
many reliable skilled laborers v/hose pre-Kazi fidelity had been
given to the Social Democrats or the Chri?5tian DemiOcrats.
Iviilitary Government repelled inost of these groups and treated
"good" and "bad" Germans for a long time nearly alike. Mili-
tary Governm.ent continued to stifle any political activity of
any description.
Finally on August 6, 1914.^, General Eisenhower gave the
signal to the Germ.ans to reinstitute local political activities;
1
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hov/ever, by that time, the Working Comr^l ttees had forerjone
their missionary zeal and had subsided into a riood of sullen
silence. The fraternization ban had been instrunental in de-
featin,5" the Corrr:ii ttees . In those dark days of the suinmer of
191l5, any possibility of honest political effort 3iaon- the Ger-
man people v/as difficult to envision; everywhere the Germans
v/ere concerned only with food, clothing, and shelter.
In fact, as the economic situation worsened, the hope for
a political revival seem.ed to grow weaker. The average German
wondered what rood a political party v/as, when it could not
effectuate any worthwhile program. Moreover, trie Germ.an
feared to trust inexperienced political leaders during such-
critical times. Instead, the average German decided to climb
onto the Am.erican bandwagon, but he Viras disappointed to find
that at first there was no such thing. Qhe officers and men
of Military Government could offer no guidance and inspiration;
they themselves Yiore, in large measure^ in a political vacuum
of their own.
In his speech. General Sisenhewer had sg'Oken of initiating
political activity "at the grass roots," but this term was
wasted on a large percentage of the Germ.an people, for they
possessed neither the understanding nor the interest necessary
to follow the dictates of this phrase. There was then a gen-
eral disassocia-tion of many people from all manner of political
activity; on the other hand, those who did take an interest
cI
in politics became unnatu-rally preoccupied v/ith "questions of
organization and personality" to the detriment of the more im-
portant question of fund.a:aental policies. For instance, several
of the party leaders spent their tivie criticizin,^ one another
for their actions during the Weinar I'lepublic or S'*_uabblin2: about
the m.unicipal vrater and electric ratas. Tlras, durin;- those
first months^ most of the political activity seemed to take
place ar.ong the party leaders, v/hile the mass of follov/ers re-
maiuirod skeptical and comical about r)olitics.
Ihe fundamental resison for suspicion of democracy seom.ed
to lie in the feeling that dem.ocracy is a 33'-stem which promotes
active class v/arfare , ineffectual {government, and social lax-
ness--a system of governinent which a completely paralyzed
country cannot afford. Many Germans felt, in other words,
that the encouragement of party politics would encourarje the
growth of political leaders v/hose every effort would be concen-
trated on fi£;htin2 one another rather than working; for the
reconstruction of Germany, '. any Germans 7/ere vvillin;:; to have
a strong; leader to make Germany's vital decisions. Althou-q-h
the middle class is especial]^'' doubtful about de:"0cratic par-
ties, it dared not turn com.ple tel^T- from the offerin.^^s of the
western Allies, because the threat to iit'% econom.ic and social
ord^r by the Fiussians in the East remained.
Ihe western Allies, for their part, dared not feel smug
and sure that the Germ.ans would turn their way, since the exis-
cc
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tence of a political void meant that any pov/erful movement
could m.ove in to capture the German minds and bodies; namely,
a neo-liazi or stronr: nationalistic movement. There was no
liberal tradition of local self -government and strong individu-.
alism to which the Germans could turn for strength and guidance,
On November 6, the Council of States, the Laenderrat, was
formally or5;anized. Its function v/as to organize the v/ork of
the states so that the advantages of uniform, legislation and
administration could be passed on to the Germ^an Laender, as
uellasto American liilitary Government. Ihe three original mem-
bers of the Laenderrat were the three inis ter-Presidents--
Wilhelm Hoer^ner of Bavaria, Karl Geiler of Greater Hesse, and
Reinhold Kaier of V/uerttemberg-3aden--all of v/hom had been
originally selected by L'ilitary Government to administer their
respective zones in the nam.e of the Occupation, 'Ihe Laenderrat
m.e t at Stuttgart under the auspices of Dr. James 1.. Pollock,
American director of the Regional Governmental Coordinating
Office, the man who had prepared the directive bringing the
Laenderrat into existence.
Although the Laenderrat at first was little more than a
discussion committee, it did i'lanage to clear up much of the
confusion which characterized early American L'ilitary Govern-
ment activities in Germ.any. After the Laenderrat shov/ed itself
to be of value, a directorate to handle the routine natters was
added, leaving to the Laenderrat the significant decisions.
€€
For its participation in the retreat from incipient chaos, the
Laenderrat with its Cxerman officials and American supervisors
deserves a great deal of commendation.
Prom the time of General Eisenhov/er ' s "[:rass roots" speech
in August, 19' 1.5 J the Ignited States had begun to plan the first
rural elections, even though it was some'i^hat reluctant to
allow the resurrection of political parties.
What were the social classes around ".-/hich the political
parties vvere to form?
The class structure of ^"ermany influenced the content
and policies of tiie contesting p-orties so very s trongl^r that
a brief discussion of the classes is necessary to widen the
understanding of the parties. Tne class structure in Germany
was nearly the same as it had been in 1933 ^ ^"o-^ the r.asis had
not altered the class structure, just frozen it.
The up;,:.er class forms an inf initesmally sir.all group in
terras of actual number, but in terms of power it is exceedingly
large, especially in the American Zone where the status quo has
been maintained to a larger extent than elsev/here. The upper
class, consisting of the landed aristocracy, the leading mili-
tarists, and the very v/ealthy industrialists, does not mingle
in the social and political life of the communities or the
parties; yet it definitely makes its wishes known from out-
side the political ring. The members of the upper class speak
and associate with other members of their own group only; in
fc
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fact, since the occupation of Germany, they seem to stay more
removed from politics and the c omi'-iuni ty than during the Y/eimar
Republic period. Many of them se m to prefer the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, because that party seems to reflect the most
rabid nationalism of any of the parties.
!Ihe middle class, -which forms less than ten percent of the
total population (maybe less as a result of the levelling pro-
cess of the war), is itself divided into several groups, includ-
ing the intellectuals, the professional men, the teachers, the
public adm.inis trators , the m_embers of the clergy, the political
leaders of all the parties, the students of the higher schools
and universities, and the journalists. BecA'ise this group
arrived on the scene only after the retarded industrial revolu-
tion in Germany, it had no oppor tuni t\'- to develop as the pro-
tector of democracy as it had in the other western pov/ers.
Some of the members of this group Flight have had the will for
democracy, but they lacked the political power to effect it,
!Ihe middle class as such still controls much of the eco-
nomic wealth of Germany. It has been slov/ to recover since the
collapse of 19l)-5, partly because of the fact that it was very
closely aligned with the Nazis and partly because of the
severe material da^nages it suffered during tbe v/ar.^ Its posi-
tion of leadership in society through its control of mar.y of
the German institutions, like the schools, banks, et., remains
David Rodnick, Postv/ar Germans
,
(New liaven, IpL^S ) , p. ik.
c
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relatively unimpaired. Iloreover, it has a near monopoly of
the technical and administrative. skills which Military Govern-
ment with its heavily depleted staffs desperately needs.
The middle class has not retreated one iota frou its feel-
ing of class unity, in spite of the fact that its standard of
living has slumped sharply since the conclusion of V/orld V/ar
II. Ihe nearer the members of the middle .class find their in-
com.es being approached by the working people, the tighter they
attempt to hold their distinctiveness. That the working class
through the t\70 parties of the Left is increasing its political
strength and economic power is increasingly evident to the
middle class. Since the western powers have maintained the
status quo in their zones of Germany, the ^riddle class feels
confident that it will soon reassume its position of preemin-.
j
ence
.
/44ither writer feel^"that the m.iddle class is extinct. It
has been based on "property v;hich is destroyed, on trade v/hich
;
has ceased, and on superior education which has disappeared. "5
I.tr. Trevor-Roper writes that Germany, a prole terian state, has
only tv/o classes that count, the "unpolitical peasants and the
dispossessed."
Although it is tr-j.e that som.e of the m.iddle -class members^'
su]piported the liberal parties during vVeimar days, it is also
true that a much larger percentage fell prey to the German
Nationalist Party of Alfred Hugenberg and the National
5. New York Tlm.es Magazine
,
July 6, I9I4.7, Sect. 6, p. 9.
c
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Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler.
The peasant is not :-uch interested in politics. His in-
terests are extremely parochial, in that he seldon sees beyond
the linits of his individual farm or at most the individual
coinnunit^^ of v/hich he is a nember^ He values his privacy
highly, and he, therefore, dislikes the Social Democrats and
Communists, v/ho intend to invade his bailiv/ick when they are
in power, rie prefers to support those p^^.rties which v/ill help
him receive hi£"her prices for his ~ocds and pay lov/er prices
for the goods he purchases,
Ihe peasant is evincing' a distinct hostility toward demo-
cracy, partly because he associates it with the ills of G-ermany
today, partly because a large num.ber of " ' soldiers are
returning to the farms and promoting i,azi ideolory and a strong
German nationalism, Ihe traditional leaders in the local farm
comirunity-- the school teacher, the mayor, and the clergyman--
have contributed relatively little to the fight to overcome
these hostile ideas. Ihe teacher in many cases has failed to
pass the denazification board's examination and has been re-
placed by a woman vino does not have the high social standing
in rural society which her predecessor had. Ihe mayor, being
of the peasants, stands v/ith the peasants; as does the clergy-
man, v/ho has helped the peasant to resist iv-ilitary Government
rationing orders or refugees-resettlement orders. Ihe peasant
simply cannot understand why the Nazis, not the present
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government, are responsible for his difficulties.
Ttie number of peasants has been sharply increased by the
presence of tlirse million expellees from other nations. Al-
though tv/o-thirds of the expellees are not farmers, m.ost of
them with their pro-lTazi propensities have been sent to the
countryside v/here they will further propa^-andize the i,^:norant
peasants, llilitary Government ?aas approved a law to provide
small farms and garden plots for expellees, evacuees from
bombed-out cities, and other needy persons. Ihe la-v also in-
tends to make more land available to farmers v/hose present
holdings are too small to support them and to industrial v/orkers
in rural areas v/hose incomes from industrial employment are
insufficient.
The Y/orkers of German^^ receive the sm.allest remuneration
for their toils, both economically and aocially. Ihey stand
at the very foot of the social ladder. Because the -..-orkers
have had such hard sledding financially, they tend to be inter-
ested mainly in "work and bread," rather than'\he socialistic ;
program of the Social Dem.ocra.tic Party. Ihe porcenta:'"e of those
v/ho attend the so-called "riiddle schools" or^ laterj adult educa- '
tion classes is so small as to be insignificant. Ihe \.'orkers
have not forgotten their debacle under the ilazis. They tend to
I, identify the employing groups v^rith the llazis, because they
(the v;ork-rs) suiEfered a great deal under the l:azis. '^he -vork-
ers v/ish": to increase their stake in industry by attaining some
measure of representation and power over the manafrem^ent and
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control of economic enterprises.
The procedure outlined by Iiilitary Govermient for the for-
mation of political parties was neither complex nor unreason-
able. In order to form, a party needed on the local level ten
sponsors and on the Land level twenty-five sponsors v/ho were
proved politically reliable. After an exam.ination of the spon-
sors and a study of the party creed. Military G-overnment offi-
cers issued a provisional license to allov/ the approved party
to com:mence formin:-;, subject to approval at a later date by
higher headquarters. To avoid any militaristic show, no par^y
viras allov/ed to parade or to wear distinguishing uniforms, but
non-inflammatory party Insignia and emblem.s were acceptable.
The funds of each licensed party were subject to . ilitary Gov-
ernment's periodic scrutiny through reports. All political
literature, radio broadcasts, and public meetings had to be
approved beforehand. Ihe candidates them.selves had to be
cleared by denazification boards, before they could present
them.sGlves as aspirants for public office. The law of each
Land prescribed the qualifications a candidate must have for
each office and required each candidate to present a petition
signed by a certain munber of voters and filed a prescribed
period before the day of election.
The mayor on the local level chose the committee 041 elec-
tionj, a comj-iiittee v;hich had to be com.posed of at least one mem-
ber of each main party. Some tv;o v/eeks or more before the day
of election, the mayor v/as required to post a list of the eli-
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gible voters. The mayor and tho committee on elections listen-
ed to appeals from people v/ho felt, for one reason or another,
that they had been discriminated Ain one way or another in
the matter of voting. ITo nam.es could be added to the voting
list within seven days of the election.
A special election law decided v/hat the voting precincts
were to be, hov/ the precinct election board v/as to be selected,
how the ballot was to be prepared, how voting was to take
place, how the election returns were to be certified, and how
the successful candidates were to be notified. 'ihe law of the
Land had already specified the length of the term of office
and the duties of the office,
i.'ilitary Governiv.snt, after seeing that the different Ger-
mian governinents had set up an elaborate election law, m.ade cer-
tain rules in regard to the formation and administration of
parties. Ihe terms pf office for party members v/as set for one
full year with elections for office by secret ballot and by
majority vote. All meetings and conventions had to be announ-
ced at least one week in advance, unless an unforeseen em.ergen-
cy arose. If two or more parties agreed at their convention to
amalgam.ate, then such a fusion was acceptable. Each union v/as
required to keep adequate and regular financial records, sub-
je-ct to periodic audit. Each member in good standing in a
party had to be presented with a statem^ent or card proving his
claim to mem.bership. If the party wished to expel a man, it
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had to give that man a hearing before an impartial party board,
•/foat parties formed in the American Zone? Vifhat were their
principles and practices?
Ihe Social Democrats were and still are faced v/ith an al-
most insuperable problem, in that their political history has
been continually marred by the conflict between their theory
which is I.arxist and socialist and their practice which so far
has been bourgeois-dem.ocratic , The Social Democrats' strength
lies in their control of the trade union movement, a movem_ent
which once ranked as one of the stronrest and most progressive
in the world^ before liitler placed it under the labor dictator-
ship of Robert Ley, As of I'ovember, Ip'-'-T * the strength of the
trade union m.embsrship stood at one and one -half millions in
the American Zone, Tn.e Socio.l Democrats in the West have been
striving to bring their theory in line with their practice;
whereas in the East to compete with the Comjnunists, they have
attempted to identify their practice with their theor:^--a dif-
ficult Dr. Jekyl and Lir. Hyde maneuver, Uie party itself
opposes revolutionary m.easures to gain its reforms, preferring
to reach its gain of a socialized state through m.oderate land
reforms J the nationalization of banks, m.ines, insurance com-
jj
panics, cooperatives,* legislative curbs upon the abuses of
' capitalistic enterprises* and the general improvsm-ent of the
|j
worker's status,*^ It has favored adequate denazification
m.easures, par tly_ to_winJ^es tern_a22?:QY§-i_SG^-_2^^^ because it
6. Occupation of G-erm-any, Policy and Progress , the Department
of atate Publication 278^, p. sl] .
f
remembers very well that it, as the only party to vote against
Hitler's notorious Enabling Act of 1933, w^-s driven ignominious-
ly out of existence by the r.azi3.
Follov/inr: the pron;ran of the Second Internationale and the '
British Labor Party, the Social Denocrats favor the breaking -|
up of large estates for the needy, the restriction of inlieri-
tance rights, and the policies of the Four Freedoms. Logicall37-|
they oppose the removal of heavy industry from C-ermany, because ']
ii
they are certain that such a course will make m.ere paupers of
,|
i
their working class adherents. 'Ihey explain ITazism. as "the
last phase of capitalism," as does Franz Neumann; hov/ever
because they are cooperating with the Allies as they did in
I9IS, they are considered by tlieir enemies to be Am.erican
mouthpieces and anti-Cferman,
In foreign affairs, they oppose vehe-'^ently the revision of
Germany's frontiers and the internationalization of the P.uiir
and the Rhine land.
i|
This party is definitely in line with the realism of Ger-
many's present. In fact, many experts feel that this party is
|
the best friend that the Allies have in Europe. Many of the
j|
party members are "men of education and v/ith a pan-European
orientation, "7
llie leader of the Social Demiocrats was and is Eurt Schu-
macher, a man who spent ten years of his life in concentration
caiTips. He is a socialist through and through, a born leader
Saul Iv. Padover, Experiment in Germanv, Duell,(.Kev\f York,
e
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whom the British seen to be grooming as a possible candidate
for the leadership of united V/e stern Germany when it is formal-
ly activated. He is considered to be the most powerful foe of
Communism in Germany today. Ke Is an internationalist who
fears a revival of Clerrian nationalism, yet opposes the prefer-
ence for a federal German state of several of his subordinates.
'Ihe Christian Dem.ocratic Union (the Christian Social Union
in Bavaria), an outgrov/th of a political union of the Protes-
tants and Catholics to oppose the growth of Uazism, seems to
have inherited the principles of the old Center Party and the
Bavarian'.; People's Party, except now it is m.aking an attempt
to be non- sectarian. Its membership, essentially a middle-
class religiou's one, is drawn from the business, clerical,
peasant, and moderate labor groups. It is m.aking a strong ap-
peal to v/omen, possibly because of its religious associations
with Catholic and Protestants groups. It bases its m,ain hopes
for German revival on "Christian morality" and a return to the
tenets of private property and individualism, ^ Unfor tu.nately
,
its middle-of-the-road policies seem: to displease both its con-
servative Fiembers from, the old Grerman I^'ationalis t Party and its
liberal memJbers from the old Center Party. 'Ihere ,is the dis-
tinct possibility that the party v/ill one day lose its lower
middle -class su'ppcrt to the Social Dem-Ocrats and its upper
middle-class support to the Liberal Dem.ocrats.
Ihe Christian Socialists and Dem.ocrats support the Social
3, Occupation of Germany
,
Dep. of State Publ. 2703, p.
r
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Democrats in demanding- more employee representation in the
raanagenent of individual firms, but Ikcy j.^eveal.-. more clearly tkfcrV
desire that the consumer be represented in the large "industrial
agencies." In keeping with its strong cleric-il support, the
party su'oports a continuation of the denom.inational school sys-
tem still in force i?i^/e stern G-ermany, Politically, the party
is much interested in furthering professional representation,
rather than geographical representation; however it does stay
loyal to formal parliamentary democracy. Ihe party has support-
ed v/hat many .consider to be an intelligent solution of tlie denaz
ification mess which has plagued the American Zone for the past
three years. It asks that passive Ilazis be returned to active
German life to prevent trieir becoming ostracized malcontents
whose very presence in the 3-erm.an nation v/ould eat av/ay the
v/ork of the "right" Germ.ans as a cancerous growth. It loins
the Social Dem.ocrats in proclaiming that Germ.any's participation
in a future 'Yes tern European i'^ederation is its goal,
A main v/eakness of the party is that its opponents consi-
der it to be the tool of the Vatican v/hich supports religious
divisions and cannot unify the German nation as a v/hole.
The Christian Social bnion of Bavaria reflects the strong
Bavarian Catholic preference, strong Bavarian conservatism,
and strong particularism. In fact, the Christian Social Union
talks often of making Bavaria a state indeperident of the rest
of Germany,
Tlie Communist Party continues to be the same disciples of
r
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, revolutionary reforn as it has been rir:ht alon,^r. It seeks to
promote a radical reform in Germany's social structure by wip-
ing out the old Junker-nilitaris t rulin'^ clique, dividing the
large land holdings among small holders, and socializing much
of the German econom.y. Its strength is derived fror rural
labor and the more unsliilled members of the trade union move-
ment.
The members of the Cor.riunist Party are in general well
indoctrinated, and they understand their party's strategy and
hopes much more clearly than the nem.bers of the Social
Democratic Party do. The Communists in the western zones feel
that they are the rejected ones, the unwanted, but tliat the
unbelievers of today will soinetimie take cognizance of the
rightness of the ComjTiunist stand. In other words, the Commun-
ists are certain that the knowledge and foresight which they
alone possess will enable them to seize power and build for
themselves a happier life than is now their lot. They know
the necessity of having v/ell- trained leaders in their ranks;
they ;vere the very first ones to set up schools for the train-
ing of their leaders and organizers in the American Zone, Hesse,
The Communists, too, have made many direct appeals to women,
because the party leaders feel that unless v/onen are given a
satisfying status in German life, they y/ill again succumb to
Nazism or the ireo-Fascis ts .
The fourth "major" party is the Liberal Democratic Party,
the inheritors of the traditions of the pre
-1933 Germ.an Demo-
c
cratic and Gernian People's Parties, It is ?tronffly right-win.?^
and middle-class. Its strength stems from the business elements,
the civil service, and the intelli>:entsia, v/ho are determined
to rebuild Gerrrany accordinr to the tenets of laissez-faire v;ith
a strong authoritarian governaTient and a professional bureau-
cracy, Ihe party looks as far Right as it dares, considering
the present unpopularity of the Nazis, who were themselves the
|
product of conservative manipulations and promotions, l.uraer-
ically it is very weak, especially in the Am.erican Zone, be-
cause the middle class itself is numerically v/eak. ;"any of
the younger Germans approve of it, for it dares to be so opanly
nationalistic and an ti -American.
This party, the Liberal De"iocratic Party, v/as first organ-
ized in the Soviet Zone in June, I9L1-3', while the American Zone
lay in a political, social, -and economic vacuum. Its Soviet
ancestry does nothing to commend it to the American authori-
ties. The man who le%j it, Wilhelm Kuelz, is a "gentleman of
the old school, " a man who seems unable to cope v/ith the dy-
nam.ic ruthlessness of the parties in Germany. 9 lb the western
pov/ers, he and his party seem to be the puppets of Lioscov/; to
the Russians, he and his party seem, to be the tool of the
reactionary ".Vest. In trying to be all things to all people,
his party has become in some ways limp and shapeless. i.!any
people feel that it is a genuine friend of free enterprise
and that i t_^is„an_intelligent_rallyin2_22i?^i»i fear
9. Joachim Joes ten, Germany; '^lat ITow? (Lew York, l^h^Q) , p. 106,
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moderate socialism. It v/ants to break the close relationship
befeveen church and state v.'hich has existed in Germany for I
many years and which is still existent in the western zones, I
The close relationship betv/een the Christian Democrats and '
the Liberal Democrats in order to present a stronp-er front
a,n;ainst the forces of the Left is temporary and will not endure,
Althou.^h m^ost of the Ainerican authorities have been .
attempting to discoura';e splinter parties, several have grown
up, A general statement about most of them would have to
include the information that they are Rightist in outlook,
though liber il in name to satisfy the Am.erican I.ilitary Govern-
ment authorities, { Ihe Allies had agreed unanimously that no
rightist or nationalist party './ould be tolerated in an^^ of the
four zones.) Ihe I.ational Democratic Party ( ths key v/ord is
kational, not Democratic) under the leadership of Dr, Heinrich
Leutchens is small and unpopular v;ith the occupation authori-
ties, because Dr. Leutchens' record during the I.azi re-'ime's
life was far from unblem.ished.
Another splinter party is the Scono^nic Reconstruction
Association of Alfred Loritz in Pavaria. If any German party
leader em.ploys obviously Fascist political tactics, Alfred
Loritz does. To him, his party followers are mere tools to be
used and throvm aside v/hen their usefulness is over.
Another still insignificant party is the Democratic People'ii
Party, which looks backward to the liberalism of the nineteenth
century for its inspiration. It supports, of course, private
.
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property, a moderately responsible '-;overni:ient . Its strength
lies in the professional and aerchant class of Vmer ttei-nberg
Protestants.
Vvhen the parties first started to operate, there were fev;
\rho were not discouraq;ed . The ablest of the leadership were
not available, since the l^azis had imprisoned or killed a
large majority of the stron.~ leaders of the opposition. The
parties, because they had no paper or presses to issue party
propap-anda, were unable to inform their members and prospective
adherents of their policies; the3^ had no buildings to use as
headquarters or for public meetings; they were restricted in
movement, since they had no vehicles to operate as a political
party should. American i^ilitary Government did little or
nothing for them, in the v/ay of providing special privileges.
Hie start the parties m.ade was poor. The audiences which
the parties attracted were middle-aged and uninform.ed. The
future bulwarks of the parties, the youth, were not present,
except in very limited num.bers. At the public m.ee tings the
party leaders could discuss only relativel^r inconsequential
local issues md could do little more than call for "dem.ocratic'
patience. The really important issues of food, reparations,
trade narriers, boundaries, unification, etc,, were forbidden
topics for discussion. The ^erm.an audiences asked few ques4
tions; they were apathetic,
lifnen, therefore, l.-ilitary C-overmnent called for the first
f4
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local elections in January of I9I16, the party leaders were dis-
mayed, es",oecially the Is aders of the Left, who ar^^ued that
the leftist parties had been ttie last to crranize and had not
been given a sufficient amount of tine to inform the voters as
to their policies. Ihe Gorraiiunis ts and the Social Democrats
feared tliat tv/elve years of Nazi indoctrination had v/eakened
their positions beyond the possibility of restitution; v/hereas
the liberal and conservative groups remem.bered vividly the
temporary plunge to the Left vhich G-ermany took in 1913.
!-ilitary Government officials denied a postponement of the
first i^ral elections, declaring that tlie parties had had time
to enlighten their constituents about their platforms and their
candidates. It was, then, with much trepidation that the par-
ties prepared for the first elections, knowing that the elec-
tions were taking place too scon after the activation of the
parties and t'lat there was little room for clear differences
of opinion v/ithin the parochial subjects allowed to be dis-
cussed.
Just before the election, the Comiiiunists made a good im-
pression on a large number of C-ernan people by signifying their
willingness to forego their distinctive party label and become
merged with the Social Democrats. Ihey were willing, they as-
certained, to unite for the ,good of working-party unity. This
attempt by the Coimnunis ts and the subsequent refusal of the
Social Democrats in tlie western zones to merge frightened the
opposing parties. Ihe latter knew that such a merger for the
f4
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future would remain a distinct threat, especially since the
leaders of the Social Democratic party favored the merger. At
this time Military :^overni^ent remained aloof from the merger
discussion, but it did insist that no merger v/ould be accept-
able until the m.embers of the tv/o parties had been given an
opportunity to vote on the issue. V'/hen the vote was taken,
the mem.bers of the Social Democratic Party voted almost three
to one for an alliance to prevent a civil v;ar in v/orking- class
ii ranks, but they did vote more than four to one against an out-
ij
right merger, m.uch to the relief of Llilitary Ciovernnent
.
Although the parties labored under the many hampering
difficulties and shortcomings v/hich I have been emphasizing,
I should be eminently unfair if I did not admit that the par-
ties did much to clarify som.e of the issues of the day. Ihey
did succeed in bridging the gap between the people and the
government; they did more to explain the purposes of the
occupation than did all the informational services of "ilitary
Government during the first eight m.onths of occupation. 10
For instance, tlie parties explained denazification to the
people so that it m,ade sense, for I.iilitary Governm.ent had fail-
ed dism.ally to demonstrate to the Germans hov/ the '."/eimar Re-
public had been destro^red by the disloyal elements within the
government. Also, the parties v/ere able to call the people's
attention to dem.ocracy, at least to its forms
.
Ihey gave the
mentally _s tarved_ Germans _someth discuss
•
10, I.xOses IJoskowitz, "The Political Reeducation of the Germans,'
Politi cal Science Q.uar terly. i^o. 6l . lQ l |,6. p. ^^-^^
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In January, 19i|6, the rural elections were held in the
American Zone in areas where the population was less than
20,000. Trie election functioned under the list system of pro-
portional representation. In Baden, Bavaria, and Hesse, a
voter was perraitted to vote for only one list-- a "strain;ht
ticket"; however in V/uer ttenberq he was allov/ed to vote for
any candidates on any list--a "free list." In Wuer ttemberg and
Baden, .vhen there was only one valid list or no list at all,
the voters were perinitted to write in the narie s of any candi-
dates tliey preferred* Any ^roup could put up a list of candi-
dates, provided it met the requirements of a rep:ular political
party. Ihere were, as a result, many private lists, such as
"Liste Schmidt," "Liste Braun," etc.
In the election, the Christian Democratic Union (Christian
Social Union) gsjrnered l,i|3li.,713 votes, or 37;) of the votes.
The Social Democrats, who traditionally have found their
strength, not in the rural areas but in the cities, polled
930,001, or 2l|., ' of the votes. The Comj^iunis ts had to content
themselves with 136,733 votes, or 3;o of the votes. Ihe Liberal
Democrats and tvro other splinter parties displayed extraordinary
weakness in this first trial of strengtli, for they registered
a puny 99^230 votes, or 2.Ll>. Only 3-5> of the votes were
invalidated because of ignorance of instructions or careless-
ness. The participation in the election was unbelievably good
—
over
Many of the German voters seem to have lapsed into their

pre-1933 voting habits. It is exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, to measure the true political sentiiTient, because
there v/ere many write-ins and many candidates running on a non-
partisan slate. Some political writers have expressed the
opinion that a large number of the non-partisan slates or candi-
dates really favored the Ciiristian Democratic Union, thus push-
ing the vote for that party well over 60;j, Other political
writers interpreted the 37 •7;-^ v/hich the independents polled as
a vote of non-confidence in ttie political parties, as a fear
of D.any voters of being aligned vvith any of the parties, and
as an indication of serious organizational v/eaknesses within
the party structure. As a result of the election, fhe Christian
Democrats, the non-partisans, the write-ins, and several mis-
cellaneous groups contrived to control 83, of the seats in the
rural areas.
In April of 19h..6 , the elections for the county councils
|
were held throughout the American Zone. Ihis time there were
relatively fev^r non-partisans and write-ins, because it is diffi-
cult for an independent candidate to be well enough known in a
large area to be elected. Ihe Christian Democrats and the
Christian Socialists counted 1,96Ll,01i1 votes, or 5'-/'-'; the
Social Democrats increased their follo\;ing over the first
election, receiving 1,036,163 votes, or 2^,'; the GoLmiunists
continued to run a very poor third, polling only 195,-1-30, or
5.5/^; and the Liberal Dem.ocrats and tv/o other splinter parties
had to be satisfied v/ith 114.3,589 votes, or l^^^.
4
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In keeping with the exceedinr:ly heavy election schedule
which Llilitary Crovernitient placed before the Germans, the city
council elections fell in for six ci ties--Stuttgart, Llannheim,
Karlsruhe, Ulm, Heidelberg, and Pforzheim. This time the Social
Democrats were on].y a few thousand votes behind the Christian
Democrats and Christian Socialists. The Social Democrats re-
ceived 709,529 votes, or 37;o of the total, v/hereas their main
competitors amassed 723,166 votes, or 33%'. The Communists'
percentage jumped to nine, as a result of receiving 173,632
votes; and the Liberal Democrats' percentage approached eight,
v/ith 151,327 votes, but the votes of two minor splinter parties
were included.
Now Am.erican I'-ilitary C-overnme-nt called for the appoint-
m.ent of commissions to draft constitutions for the Laender.
It felt that if the C-er-ians were to learn about dem.ocracy, they
had to adapt their lives to democratic rules. Several em.inent
German jurists began to work on prelim.inary drafts of the
proposed constitutions. On the last day of June, 19Ll6, the
people of all three Laender went to the polls to select their
representatives for the Constituent Assemblies to write the
new constitutions. ! 'early half of the votes v/ent to the
to
Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists, and the Social
Dem.ocrats vvent one -third of the votes. The reception of such
a large popular vote by the conservative Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats m.eant that the Germ.ans v/ere not prepared
to make any kind of a radical change.
c
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During June, as the Cfemans vere preparing- to select their
representatives for the constituent assemblies, the lalitar^r
Governor -oropounded. certain conditions which v;ould have to be
met if any future German 'Jovernrient was to be considered demo-
cratic by the united States. These conditions, though ostensi-
bly applied to a future G-erman central roverninent, must have
been tal^en to heart by some of the Germans as they labored
over their ne\i constitutions. Tnese were the conditions:
a) "All political power must be reco.n-nized as
originating v/ith the people and subject to
their control,
b) "Ihose who exercise political power are
obliged regularly to renev/ their mandates
by frequent references of their programs and
leadership to popular elections.
c) "Popular elections must be conducted under
competitive conditions in which not less than
two effectively com.peting political parties
submit their program.s and candidates for pub-
lic review.
d) "Political parties must be democratic in char-
acter and must be recognized as voluntary
associations of citizens clearly distinguished
from, rather than identified with, the instru-
mentalities of government,
e) "The basic rights of the individual, inclu-
ding free speech, freedom of reli'ious prefer-
ence, the riii-ht of assem.bly, and freedom of
political association, must be recognized and
guaranteed.
f) "Control over the instrumentalities of public
opinion, such as the radio and press, m.ust be
diffused and kept free from g:overrmient domina-
tion,
g) " Ihe rule of law must be recognized as the
individually greatest single protection
cc
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against a capricious and v/ilful expression
of ,r:overni;ient power, and a.^ainst the arbi-
\
trary domination of temporal ac^encies of
goverm^ent control, "11
l^inally in October, 19'J-6, the v/ork of the three conven-
tions v;as coripleted. Although Military '^overnir.ent had sent
a n;roup of con.sul tants to the respective conventions, the
.
American representatives did not dictate in any v/ay to the
conventions. IJilitary Governriient emphasized that the constitu-
tions were the product of "German work and German thought,"
I.iilitary Government in Germany and the Vi/ar Depar t-'ent in
vVashinf; ton, which approved the constitutions, declared that
the constitutions represented "a hi£;h concept of a democratic
state." 'ihere were a few sm_all changes recomjr.ended, only one
of v/hich incited a determined reaction from, the writers of the
constitutions. Hie one clause which hilitary Government ex-
pressly disliked was Article h.l of the Hesse Constitution,
providing for tlie autom.atic socialization of mdnes, iron and
steel works, power production and distribution, rail and v/ire
transportation, and state supervision of large banks and insur-
ance comipanies ,--2 I'ilitary Government, for its part, suggested
tha.t such a fundam.ental change be made "perm.issive rather than
m.andatory." Hie Social Democrats had encorporated this clause
in the constitution, for they stated that they had to win the
confidence of the people by standing solidly on m.atters of
II. Monthly Report of the I.ilitary Governor, U.S. Zone, ho. 20,
20 July 19l}-6, p. 3.
12, Ibid, No. 23, I-3I October I9I4-6, p. 6 ff.
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principle, as they had failed completely to do throu-rhout the
Weimar Republic days. The Social Democrats argued that Article
I4.I was not intended to '^Avq full state control over industry
and the worl:ers, but tliat it was intended to distribute control
amonr^ several agencies, such as the communities, the worlrers,
the quasi-public corporations, the investors, and, of course,
the state, ActualD.'^i a lar^^e part of the socialization which
Article h.l envisioned v/a? a day-to-day fact, since the state
had already introduced wide social reforms.
After bein;7 accepted by a 136-1!l vote in the Bavarian
convention, by an 33-1 vote in the Wuer ttemberg-Baden conven-
tion, and by a 32-6 vote in the Hessian convention, the consti-
tutions were presented to the German electorate on Tove^iber 2)4,
19ll.6|in Vmer ttemberg-Baden and on December 1, lS>li6 , in Bavaria
and Hesse, Tbe m-ajorities in favor of the constitutions were
substantially the same in each Land--63 .6;a in IVuer ttemberg-
Baden, 62,1}.;'' in Bavaria, and 67 ,2'/i in Hesse, Article of the
liesse constitution received a substantial 62.7;'- in its favor.
What did these constitutions attempt to accomplish?
Since these constitutions were framed under the aegis of
an Araeric3.n Army of Occupation with Americans sitting in at
the conventions as advisers, there should be little surprise
occasioned over the announcement that the Laender constitutions
are in many respects sim.ilar to th^^ir American counterpart
and
J
too ; the V/e imar con s ti tu t i on
.
Land Hesse, v>rith its slightly more than four million
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people and 8221 squa.re miles, is considered the most prof-ressive
state within tiie American orbit. Its constitution, as do the
other two, provides for elections by proportional representa-
|
tion, for a temporary suspension of civil rip:hts in case of i
an emergency, and for a supreme court v.-hich can rule a law to
be unconstitutional at any tim.e , v/ithout waitin:.' for a case
involving a certain lav/ to be presented to it. The framers of
the Hesse constitution prcvjided for a unicam.eral ler;islature
to be elected every four years; hov/ever Article 155 provides
that the constitution m.ay be amended to add a second body,
Ihe legislature, the Landtag, ma^r be dissolved by a majority
of its mem.bers. Dissolution takes place automatically in Messe
if after the resignation of the I, inis ter-President , the Landtag
within twelve days does not vote affirmatively, on a motion
expressing confidence in the new cabinet, Ihus, Hesse does
have cabinet government which must maintain the confidence of
the Landtag or resign, A vote of non-confidence against the
Minister-President must be Cafitb-y at least one -half of the
legal number of the Landtag's membershixD, Ihe right of the
Landtag to force the resignation of the cabinet is not recipro-
cated by the right of the cabinet to force the Landtag to re-
sign. In order to be eligible to run for tlie L-andtag, a candi-
date need be only twent^r-five years of age. Article 4I, as
v^as previously stated, contains moderately wide- spread social-
istic features. Hiis constitution, as do the other two, con-
tains an elaborate bill of rights at the urgent "request" of
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Military CTOvernnont authorities; ho\.'ever it v/ill not become
effective in any state until the*tentativG date of January 1,
IpiiO, by v/hich time denazification should be complsted.
In order to discourage the formation of splinter parties, the
Hessian constitution provides that the Landtag raa.j pass a law
refusing any representation to a party receiving less than a
certain percentar^e of the total vote of Hesse; hov/ever that
percentage may not be set higher than 5,
On December 20, lS^^-6, the nev/ Hessian legislature chose
the Social Democrat Christian Stock, a former trade union
leader, to become I'lnis ter-Pre sident to succeed the L'ilitary
Government appointee. Dr.' i;arl C'eiler. I'r. Stock selected
five Social Democrats and four Christian Democrats to fill the
nine cabinet posts.
Wuerittemberg-Baden' s constitution is considered m.ore demO'
cratic thsin Bavaria's, thour-h less socialistic than Hesse's.
Carl Schmidt brou^'ht his exceptional talents io bear on this
constitution for trie three and tv/o-thirds millions of people
in an area of 59^0 square miles. 'Hhe constitution contains a
preamble v;hich expresses trust in T'-od and a wish to honor the
dignity of man and his "eternal rights.'' The legislature is
a unicam/aral body consisting of one hundred representatives
elected for a four-year term of D'ffice. A candidate r.iust be
twenty-five years of age in order to be eligible to try for
legislative office. The representatives selected by tlie
C
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people to ':o to the Landtag are reminded j.r., .a.,, constitution
that they are responsible to their consciences for their acts,
not to party instructions and domination. 'me constitution
allov/s the Landtag to set a minimum percentage of votes to be
cast in the state, not to exceed ten percent, in order to re-
ceive representation in the Landtag. Gfeneral Clay found this
provision especially incompatible v/ith democratic principles
Tne Landtag m.ay be dissolved by popular referendum upon popular
initiative. "Jlie governi'.ien t of Wuer ttemberg-Baden perform.s as
a cabinet government, even thou';:h the constitution professes
a belief in the separation of pov/ers, v;hich is completely
irreconcilable with cabinet government. To continue in pov/er,
the cabinet must have Landtag confidence. Sie L.inis ter-Pre si-
dent is elected for four years by the Landtag, but he may be
dropped by a no-confidence vote at any tim^e.
The incum.bent Ilinis ter-Pre sident. Dr. ?ieinhold :..aier, v/as
reelected by the Landtag on Dec em.ber l6, I9I4.6, although he is
a member of the relatively unimportant German People's Party,
All four of the m.ajor parties are represented in the new govern-
ment.
Bavaria, the largest German state, has almost nine million
persons v;ithin its borders, a 23, increase over its population
figures for 1939* This large increase in population is largely
attributable to the influx of German refugees from other
countries. I^'ic Christian Socialists dominated the convention
and thus the constitution. Sie product of their v/ork is
fc
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considered the most removed rroi.i denocratic ideals. ' lie ivari-
an preamble admonishes tiie state to be '"lod-fearing, not just
political a-nd social in its outlook. It is v/orthy of mention
that democracy was m.entioned in tlie pream.ble, apparently as an
after thou,^ht to please the Americans, Bavaria specixically
si:ates in its constitution that the representatives are not
znerely party spokesmen, but rather are responsible to the dic-
tates oi* their consciences, Uie legislature of Bavaria was
set up as a bicameral one-"-the Senate miade up of functional and
occupational representatives elected for six-year terms and the
Landtag made up of geographical representatives. 'f-.e Senate
was not elected until one year later, but its sixty members
represented industry, ap^riculture and forestry, welfare orj^ani-
zations, labor unions, religious bodies, educational institu-
tions, municipalities, counties, provinces, and even trade and
farm associations. TLie Senate may introduce bills in the Land-
tag; advise the cabinet v;hen so aslied, es2~ecially in regard to
budgetary miatters, constitutional amendments, and lav/s to be
referred to the people for approval; and review Landtag legis-
lation before promulgation. Tne Senate must return the bills
virithin one m.onth to the Landtag if an ordinary matter, or with-
in one week if an exceptionally important m.attero Ihe Landtag
is bound not at all by the Senate's recom.mendations
,
Ihe famous "ten percent" clause m.eans that the composition
of the Landtag is limdted to members of parties v;hich are
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able to poll at least ten percent of the votes in any district.
Tcie Landtag; may be dissolved hj a majority vote of the members,
by popular referendum upon popular initiative, or by the Presi-
dent of the Landta,^ if, upon resirj;nation or deatii of the I.'inis-
ter-President, a successor has not been selected within four
weeks. The Landtag cannot be dissolved by the cabinet, nor can
the Landtag force the resignation of the cabinet. Article
requires the resignation of the I inis ter-Pre sident if "political
relationships m.alze cooperation betwe&n him and the Landtag im.-
possible." ihe ilinis ter-President
,
then, reserves to him.self
m-uch of the decision as to v/hen he wishes to resign. There is
no provision which allows the Landtag to take a no-confidence
vote to force the resignation of the cabinet, oavaria's con-
stitution provides for a mixture of cabinet government and
pEesidential gcverrj^ient. Like the other constitutions,
Bavaria.' s stipulates that there be denominational schools;
however, in an area if a reasonable nuiiber of parents or
guardians responsible for the education of children request
special schools, they may be granted that wish. Bavaria like
the other two Laender provides for social insurance, protection
of labor's right to collective beirgaining, socialization of
certain basic industries, etc.
I'ilitary 'Tovernm.ent ' s previous selection. Dr. Koegner,
v/as replaced as I.'inis ter-Pre sident by Dr. llsxis Shard, a
lawyer, who organized his cabinet to make it a coalition of
Christian Socialists and Social Democrats: hov/ever in September
.
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ipI'^Y , the Social Democrats decide they could no longer tolerate
continual compromises, and all of them resigned, allowing Dr.
Tiihard to replace them v/ith Christian Socialists.
Do these :;-erman-formulated constitutions have any advan-
tages over dictated constitutions? A recent report of ttie
Brookings Institution has this to say:
" Itie v/isdom of som.e method of consulting the wishes of the
G-erman people can hardly be doubted, not only to conform v/ith
the -principles of a just peace, but to engage the Imov/ledge of
the Germans in the complexities of constitution-making and
their support of the final product. A perfect constitution is
highly improbable in any event and if it has German support,
the German problem of the future v/ill be so much the simpler
because the resentm.ent against the peace settlemient m.ay then
be centered on the conditions attached to German authority
rather than diffused in criticizing the imperfections of a
foreign made cons ti tution. "13
The results of the Land legislative elections, v/hich took
place on the very same day that the constitutions were being
accepted, found the Christian Democratic Union and the Christ-
ian Social Union ai'.assing /Ljij.,':; of the votes; the Social Demo-
car tic Party, 3L;.; of the votes; the Corimunis ts
,
3.1.;.
' of the
votes; and the Liberal Democratic Psirt^r and tv/o other splinter
parties, a bit over 9\5.
On J§nuary_Gi_12U2A J2®£2?16_ the_newl^
13. Quoted by Charles Gratke, iiilitary C-overnj-ient Journal
,
February lol^r.
, p . 20.
c
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the Deputy Liilitary Governor said that it v/as • ilitary G-overn-
ment's policy to "maintain a hif^h de^^ree of local responsibili-
ty and to hold national lep;i3lation to the essential rainimum.
It v/ill continue to be the policy of iiilitary Governrient to
consult v/ith the Laenderrat to the fullest extent possible in
the preparation of quadripartite legislation which must be
issued by Llilitar^'" Govern.;.ent decree or ordinance for applica-
tion in each of the states."!^ In the fields -^vhere four-pov/er
agreement could not be attained, tlie Laenderrat v/ould be asked
to prepare such 1 e.-^jislation subject to the approval of I'ilitary
Gover:nent. "It r.iust continue to study, corninent, and recom"*-^ '
iriend"l5 on quadripartite lecrislation to be nade applicable to
Germany as a v/hole . Each ''inis ter-President is charged with
executinr- Laenderrat and 3izonal legislation. " Thus it seems
to me that you have been given nov; the full measure of self-
responsibili ty v/hich is possible until some form of provisional
government is established for Germany as a vhole."l6
On January 21, 19^+7? Brem.en ?/as admitted by Military
Government Proclamation lio, 3 as the fourth united States
Land, v/ith the provision that the existing government in Bre-
men and V/esermuende was to continue until a ne:-! constitution
could be created and an election held. lhat arrangement v/as
not harsh on the people of the fourth American Land, because
ih.. Monthly Report of the Llilitary Jovernor, U.S. Zone , i"o. 19,
1-31 January 19l|.7
, p. 3.
15. Ibid , p.
16, Ibid
, p. I].,
€C
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thsre had been an election on October I3 , 19-/' j '^cr the legis-
lature and on j.over.ber 23, 19Il6, for the Sehate. ihe Social
Democrats v:ere by far the strongest at that tine.
On October 10, Ipl-l-? , the voters of Erenen trooped to the
polls to express their wishes, "Kie newly created con-titu-
tion received the approval of 72.6/j of the voters, but Article
i|.l, which grants "certain r-anagement rights to work councils,"
passed by a mere 9,000 votes of a total of well over 200,000
cast, 'ihe Social Democrats ran ahead of their nearest co"ipe-
titors by almost 2-1, but they were not as stronf? as they had
been under the solicitous eyes of the British.
Beacuse the city of r;erlin is divided into four zones of
occupation an:' because it is "Lhe scene of constant four-power
bickering, I have decided to do little with Berlin. I.oreover,
compared to the more than seventeen mdllion inhabitants in
our zone in the West, the m.illion-odd persons v/hom we control
in Berlin form, only an ins i'-mifi cant part of our stake in G-cr-
many, Kore than that, four-power control of Berlin ^''ia the
Eom:;,andatura has watered down our basic Am-erican policies so
much as to make them, indistinct and even contradictory.
Following their first political defeats in the American
Zone, the Comriunists have sought numerous v/ays to make their
program more radical and therefore, they hoped, more appealing
to the Germ.an voters. So far that policy has born little
fruit, for the Coi:imunists do not have within their power the
ability to grant what the Germans most desire; namely,
rc
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au tonomy
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At about the same time that the Corrii':iunis ts decided to
tighten their belts for a lonr ideolor^ical war, the Social
Democrats he[;a.n to make plaPxS for a leaders' conference in
the V/est. It had become apparent before this time that the
Social Democrats ".;ere bep^innin^; to fear too close an alliance
with the V/es'tern Powers; for that close identification in Iplo
had been their downfall, as soon as their conservative oppo-
nents had recovered their wits and had begun to point to them
as collaborators and anti-German, To im.plement ttiis policy
of disassociating themselves from the occupying powers, the
Social Democrats issued a manifesto which was supposed to
sever all the bonds tying tliem to trie "reactionary" policies
of the occupiers and stated that their main objective was to
bring socialism to the German people by the class strug'-le.
In spite of the manifesto, there is little doubt that the
party v/ill continue to prefer socialism, v/ithin a capitalist
system over socialism, ".iithin a totalitarian system.
Secretary of St.-^.te J:arshall issued a statement in v/hich
he indicated the conC-ftpt of the United States in reference to
the future German state. The statement is im.portant, because
Vv'estern Germany, a state about to be born, will be governed
partly by the principles he enunciated, Ke vis\ialized the
German central government as one with limited powers, so that
each state could have in its grasp a large num.ber of resic^ual
powers to enable to have its own police, to control religion.
r
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to manage its internal security, e tC-, Ke also visualized an
independent judiciary to ^jrotect the individual and to decide
cases involvin;-': the state and the central f-cvernnent,!?
Finally on July 11, 19k-7 1 "tj^e Department of State issued
Y/hich was practical and Vv-orkable and v,h.ich superseded the un-
wise "JCS 1067/6," issued in April of 191l5. Tiie paragraphs
relating to the political life of Gernany are quoted:
IV, 3'. United States Political Objectives in
in G-errr.any
"It is an objective of the United States
Governrient that there should fetrise in Ger-
many as rapidly as possible a form of poli-
tical organization and a manner of politi-
cal life which, resting on a substantial
basis of economic well-being, will lead to
tranciuillity within Germany and will contri-
bute to the spirit of peace among nations.
"Your task, therefore, is fundamentally
that of helping to lay the economic and
educational basis of a sound German dem.o-
cracy, of encouraging bona fide democratic
efforts and of prohibiting those activities
which would jeopardize democratic develop-
ment.
6 • German S e 1f - Governme n t
a. "You will continue to promote the develop-
ment in Germany of institutions of popular
self-government and the assumption of direct
responsibility by German governmental agen-
cies, assuring then legislative, judicial
and executive powers, consistent with mili-
tary security and the purposes of the occupa-
tion.
b. "It is tlie view of your Government that
the most constructive development of German
17. C .L. Thompson, "beware the Ghost of V/eimar , "Forum, Jun l\.'J^
^
a "Directive Kegp^rding the Military Government of Germany"
c
throughout aermany of federal German
states (Laender) and the formation of a
central German government with carefully
defined and lim.ited pov;ers and functions.
All powers shall be vested in the Laender
except such as are expressly deleg^ated to
the Central Sovernriient.
c . "Your Government does not wish to impose
its ovm historically developed forms of
democratic and social organization on Ger-
many, and believes equally firmly that no
other external forms should be imposed.
It seeks the establishment in Germany of
a political organization v/hich is derived
from the people and subject to their con-
trol, v/hich operates in accordance v/ith
democratic electoral procedures, and v/hich
is dedicated to uphold both the basic civil
and human ri "^i"" ^-f the individual. It
is opposed cessively centralized
governrnent .rough a concentEation
of power nay threaten both tlie existence
of democracy in Germany and the security
of Germany's nei''h\iors and the rest of
the world. Yov- ;nt believes fin-
ally tha t , wl tl : inc iple s s ta te d
above, the ulti : a:, x-.; ; ti tutional form
of German political life should be left
to the decision of the Germ.an people made
freely in accordance v;ith democratic pro-
cesses.
a. "You will adhere to the policy of auth-
orizing and encouraging all political par-
ties Y/hose programs, activities and struc-
ture, demonstrate their allegiance to dem.o-
cratic principles. Political parties shall
be competitive in character, constituted by
voluntary associations of citizens in which
the leaders are responsible to the members,
and with no party enjoying a privileged
status •
b, "Y'ou will likewise give su.pport to the
principle that m.ilitary govern:aent and
the German authorities should afford non-
discriminatory treatment to duly author-
ized political parties. Every authorized
political party should have the right free-
ly to state its views and to present its
cc
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candidates to tlie electorate, and you
will tolerate no curtailment of nor
hindrance to the exercise of that
ri3;ht; if, however, you find that an
authorized party is adopting or advo-
cating undenocratic practices or ideas,
you nay restrict or v/ithdrav/ its rights
and privileges.
c."You v/ill urge in the Control Council
the recognition of nation-wide political
parties and the uniform treatment of all
authorized parties in all zones of occu-
pation. You v/ill advocate quadripartite
supervision of political activities and
of elections throughout G-ermany as a
whole. "18
^e "democrats" held a conference in October, 19^-1-7, to
consider their organization and their policies. Ihe parties re
presented included the Bavarian .''ree Democratic Party, the
Democratic People's Party of Wuer*temberg-Baden and Brem.en,
and the Liberal Dem.ocratic Party of Hesse, not an exceedingly
important party in German politics today. Ihere was a c-reat
deal of discussion as to v/he ther the "democratic" parties "
"should stand as a centrist organization representing the
'golden mean between reaction and i'arxism' or take a strong
anti-socialist stand, perhaps even to the right of the moder-
ate Christian Dem.ocratic Par t^^. "19 'The consensus seem.ed to
declare for tiie latter stand.
By November, 19^7 » "the Iiilitary Governor seem.ed to be
more confident that every tiling in Germany v/as going to "work
13, foreign Affairs Outlines
,
"Building the Peace," Department
of State, Ilo. 11, 19)-l7, pp. 3-5.
19. Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, OHG
,
No. 2b, October, I9I1-7
,
p. 11.
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out" after all. lie told the Laenderrat, "If dlsr.iantlin^^ and
denazification can be placed behind you, if the foundation is
laid in the repair of plants that remain in Germany, if you
remain steadfast in your determination, spring}; v/ill find you
v/ith nothing but a constructive job on your hands. You ••/ill
finally have an atmosphere in which democracy can f^row and in
which the German people can demonstrate their determination
to regain their place among the peoples of the world. I canno-t
but feel and hope that in spite of the fact that you face an-
other hard winter, it is a v/inter to be faced more cheerfully
and with more certainty of your own future than at any time
since the surrender . "20
Although Military Govern- 'ent talked courageously of the
grov/th of democracy in Germ.any, it continued to decide matters
for the Germans, iriatters which tliey themselves should decide
if they are ever to grope to a dim feeling for the democratic
spirit. In Wuer ttemberg-Baden, a cabinet bill in regard to
municipal elections called for a nine-^rear term for members of
the Landrat and mayors, a six-year term, for the municipal
councillors, and a four-year terra for county councillors.
Ihe Social Democrats and the Comriunis ts objected that these
terms of office \/ere far '.00 long and demanded four-year maxi-
ma for all offices, kfttj som.e consideration, Liilitary Govern-
ment handed dov/n the pontifical decision that six-year terms
v/ere sufficient for the executive officers and four-year terms
long enough for legislative officers to conform to the policy
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
LIPR'^RY
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of forcing tnose ..uo execute political pov;er "to re[-ularly
renew their raandates by frequent references of their pron:ra]TLs
and leadership to popular election. "21 Ihe final bill carried
the provision that all elected local officers v/ere to be
elected for six-year terms, but half of the coimcillors v/ere
to be elected every tiiree ye-ars for six-year terms.
On Decembsr 7, 19ll-7, Wuer tte:nberr-Zvaden conducted its 3e-
cond local elections, \/hich v;ere of r^roat interest as a means
of tracin'^ changes in political pov;er since January, 19-1-6.
Participation in the rural areas continued surprisin,":ly high--
yCfsto 90;of but in the cities participation in the elections
slu;nped as low as ^O'ato 6Q[o , much like the rate in the United
States. The list system was combined with the individual
candidate system. In terms of actual ballots, there were large
gains for the Social Democrats; but in the number of seats,
the Social Democrats made only slight gains in the m.unicipal
and county councils. Ihe Dem.ocratic People's Party gained
some of the votes which the Christian Democrats and Comjrmnists
lost. As usual, in the rural areas, there were a large number
of independent candidates elected, partly indicating a lack
of trust in the parties and partly as a result of tirie fact
that the parties had no slates in some of the ver^^ snail
communities.
In conclusion, it must be admitted that Am.erican I.'ilitary
20. Ibid , ::o. 29, November IqIj.?, p. 3.
21. Ibid
, p. 15.
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G-overnment has led other zones in settinp up the rorms of demo-
cratic livin^^ in Germany. It v/as the first to have elections
in Germany, the first to start the Germans' writinr; of consti-
tutions, but observers in Germany are sure that the Germans
are v/atchin.'^: what is r-Cilnr on in their bailiwick v/ithout under-
standing or even caring much about v/hat is be in'-- accomplished
for them from above. There is no dedication to democracy as
a "passionate ideal," but rather it is re -arded as something
the conquerors dra^r-ed in with them, to be ,n;iven lip service
for as long as they remain. Oliere is a strong suspicion that
the "democracy" of the Christian Democrats v;ill be cast aside
when subjugation to its ideals is no longer a requisi te--and
the Christian Democrats are the strongest party in Germany
today.
In fact, the pov/erful social and economic bases for a
Keo-J'ascist movement are being prescribed in the western zones
so that V'.rhen the people fsel no more compulsion to support the
Christian Dem.ocrats and the Social Democrats, the drive to
the Right and --'ascism can be accomplished v/ith relative ease.
The occupying powers m.ust work together to extirpate the
bases of influence of the \/ell entrenched ruling groups that
rem_ain anti-damocratic . Unless these anti-democrats can be
robbed of tiieir ability to destroy dem.ocracy, or the Germ.an
version of dem.ocracy, party democracy is bound to remain a
vain hope. Tlie fact that G-ermany has once followed collective
doctrines to tlie bitter end gives one the basis for hoping
c
that the G-erinans will try other paths before Uis : azi solution
will be a^ain accepted, either by the tirht ruling clique or
the people. One way that we can assist the Germans to make
the desired tarn in the road is to drop the "collective guilt"
theory, because in a manner of thinkin;.;, this tVieory is simply
the iiazi "master race" theory in reverse. 22
If we succeed in convincing the Germans of the validity
of democracy for them, we should then have real hope for a
successful "reeducation" of the "problem children" of Surope,
The Germians have always been known as extrem.ists. If they
would accept democracy, there is little doubt that they v;ould
become dem.ocrats in the extreme.
That Germ.any's democracy v/ould have to. be socialist
seems inevitable, since the task of reconstruction in Germ.any,
both of private and of public property, is so trei'^endous as
to be beyond the economic prov/ess of individual Germans,
'ihe state will have to assum.e the burden of reconstructing
Germ.any, just as it has in Great Britain.
r.oreover, if democracy is to have a chance of success in
Germany, it is essential that the Germans be convinced that
they are not really different fromi and superior to their
neighbors, as the^r think they are. 'Hieir similarities to
their neighbors must be emphasized, ratr.er than their dissimi-
larities, if the Germ.ans are ever to develop a feeling of
22. V/ilhelri .iopke. The Solution of the German Problem
,
(i:ev/
York, 19h7), p. C5,
fc
155.
"belon-ing" in Europe
,
In rer-'ard to the number of political parties, Tilitary
Covernrasnt' s policy of discouraging the growtli of splinter
parties is, I think, v/ise. The Gerrian likes to vote for a
party label tliat conforris exactly to his ov/n political
thinking; nevertheless his desire to promote more and more
parties increas3s the weakness of parties in general. If
every dem.ocratic r-overnment has to be a compromising coalition
government, then the constant necessity of diluting actions
and policies can mean difficult sledding for the democratic
process. 'Uhe big need of Clermany, hov/ever, is for rapid,
clear-cut action.
cc
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EDUCATION
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Cn April 23, lS'-t-5j more i±ian one week before t^ie actual
surrender of iiazi Germany, the very important "Directive to
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. ^^'orces of Occupation 7;egarding Ivili
tary Government of :rerij3.any ( "JCS IO67") v/as issued. Section
ll|., entitled "Education," was formualted as follov/s:
a, "All educational institutions v/ithin
your zone, except those previously estab-
lished by Allied authority, v/ill be
closed. The closure of Nazi educational
institutions, such as Adolf Hiller Schul-
en, Lapolas and Ordensburgen, and of Nazi
organizations within other educational
institutions will be perman.ent,
b, "A coordinated system of control over
German education and an affirm.ative pro-
gram of reorientation v/ill be established,
designed completely to eliminate iiazi and
militaristic doctrines and to encourage
the development of dem.ocratic ideas.
c, "You will permit the reopening of ele-
mentary ( Volksschulen) , middle"' ( l-i ttel-
schulen) and vocational ( Berufsschulen)
schools at the earliest possible dates
after Kazi personnel has been elimina-
ted. Itextbooks and curricula which are
not free of Nazi and militaristic doc-
trine shall not be used. Ihe Control
Council should devise programs looking
toward the reopening of secondary
schools, universities and other insti-
tutions of higher learning. After Nazi
features and personnel have been elim.-
Inated and pending the form.ulatlon of
such programs by the Control Council,
you may formulate and put into effect
an interim program within your zone and
in any case you may permit the reopen-
ing of such institutions and depart-
ments which offer training which you
consider imiiiediately essential or use-
ful in the administration of military
government and the purpose of the occu-
pation.
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d, "It is not intended that the military
govern-iTient v/ill intervene concernin,^ de-
nominational control of Gernan schools,
or in religious instruction in German
schools, except insofar as may be nec-
essary to insure that religious instruc-
tion and aclminis tratioh of such schools
conform to such Allied regulations as
are or may be established pertaining to
purging of personnel and curricula.'*!
1h±s directive, "chen, set the basic tone for the entire
occupational program in regard to education. 7/ith sweeping
sundenness the schools, courts, and universities v;ere imjnedi-
atel" closed; all usual German informational agencies ceased
to exist. For a time German:/ was com.pletely demoralized,
rier people waited v/ith bated breath to see v/hat the American
iT.ilitary authorities' plans v/ere and what they were going to
do in defeated Germany.
Vjhat Y/ere tb.e problem.s -.fhich the Am.erican authorities
faced in regard to the German educational system? Vjiiat was
that system?
Ihe Germ.an educational systemi, v/hich had begun during
the V/eir:ar Republic years to becom.e som-ev/hat decentralized
and under an increasing ar^ount of local comv'iunity control,
and which had striven for full individual freedom and self-
expression, v/as gradually forfeiting its eminent position
of V/orld 'Jar I days. As soon as Hitler cane to pcY/er in 1933,
he iinmediately began to stifle individual development com.bined
v;ith decentralized control. Uie academic freedom for each
1. Plojo Eolborn, Am.eri can I.iilitary Government
,
Infantry Jour-
nal Press, ( Washing ton
,
Iplf.? ) , p. lo3.
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professor, for v/hich Germany had incurred the debt of the rest
of the world durln^j the first years of the turn of the centu.ry
was effectively outlawed by making each professor an "official"
of the Reich subordinate to the universit^r rector appointed by
the state rinistr^^- of Education, v/hich was in turn responsible
to the Reichs Ministry in Berlin,
The form of the G-erman systera of education, v/hich was
not appreciably altered by the advent of liitlerisra, was con-
stituted as follov;s:
10 -—
^
his>PLir
SCHOOL
In general, every child v/as required to launch his edu-
cational training in the elementary school, though boys and
girls attended separate schools. The process of funneling
children into different schools began when the children were
ten years of age. At tlie age of ten, some of the students
went to technical schools; a small number of students, five
to ten percent ta!:en from the iniddle and higher classes,
were sent to tho classical Gymnasium; the masses went to reg-
ular higher schools where the instruction and curricula ivere
much less formal and conservative than they were in the
cc
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Gyrmasium, During-; the l:-il.l3r regime, every child at the a,c-e
of ten became a member of the hitler Youth, The National
Political Educational Institutes and the Adolf F.itler Schools
were open to certain twelve-year old youths selected from
the Hitler Youth i.ovement to receive sj)ecial National Social-
ist education and indoctrination to prepare them for local,
state, and national positions v/here "r^ood" Nazis were re-
quired. Until the -raduates of the t-./o schools viere tv/enty-
four or tv/enty-five years of a^e , they attended universities
or practiced a profession; then a carefully selected fev/
were allov/ed to attend leader schools ( Crdensbur^-en) for
three and one -half years to prepare them for important posi-
tions of leadership. The Aufbau schools were exclusively
preparations for later university training and were restrict-
ed to a sm.all number of t\/elve or thirteen year old boys v/ho
successfully passed a special examination.
Another point in regard to Y/eimar schools and, to a less
extent, I azi schools was the break-down of schools into three
broad classifications; namely, the general community school
v/hich was attended by members of all religions and v/here the
religious instruction was separate from the school work, the
denominational school, and the secular school. The great
lack of facilities forced I military G-overnment in the first
year to insist on the es tablishrient of comriunity schools, ex-
cept in Bavaria, for the general school could best accom]'io^ate
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the .'reneral school jopulace under conditions of extro -o -:c i'-
city of all kinds of facilities.
The f orer^oin?-': C-erman educational system ?/as not to be re-
formed by Military Government, a regulatory a,n;ency, but by
the C-ermans themselves. I.^ilitary Crovernment Rer-iulation 3-216
made that policy clear: "I'he G-ermans must reorranize their
ovm schools and create a new school system out of their ovm
intellectual and spiritual resources." Franz Neumann, a v;ell-
known authority on Crerman affairs, interprets the American
directives and regulations as clear admissions that Germany
was not to be "reeducated" by Military Governm^ent . On the
contrar:/, I'ilitary Government's role v/as to be restricted to
a control function of the most negative kind-- a control of
i^lazism and m.ilitary doctrines.^
Because of the vastness of the administrative plan in-
volved and because of the redeploym.ent of forces to the Pacif-
ic theater of V/ar, the Army in the first fev/ :iionths of occu-
pation was forced to alter its plans constantly to prevent
c om^p 1 e te chaos.
A main problem, in those first difficult" months was the
remioval of all unsuitable personnel from the m.ain German insti-
tutions and the forcing of adherence to the nev/ly super im.-
posed Am.erican policies before the m^ilitant fascist elements
\vere able to cripple the reorganization.
The el'ementary schools, most of them, reopened on October
^^I^Franz^.lj^^urtiann, Comiiientary
,
"Reeducating the Germans," June,
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1, 19^5« i.'iili tapy Government's policy was not to interfere
v/ith the types of schools opened, but, as v/as before mentioned
the conroiunity school v/as favored because it was usually larger
an:, could utilize the fexi teachers in the most economical
manner. Later on, the denominational school -radually becaiiie
the most prevalent in BavEria and very comr_on elseMiere.
Vi/hen the elementary schools reopened, they v/ere staffed
by less than one -half of the numbers of teachers required;
and of tliose actually employed as teachers, many v;ere mere
school helpers v/ho had not r^een trained as teachers at all.
Hiese helpers, v/ho comprised about one-fifth of all the teach-
ers employed, were 2.:iven emerri;ency teaching courses of a very
fev/ weeks' duration; then they were sent to teach on a full-
er part-time basis, reportin.';; Saturdays for superficial in-
service trainin,^:.
Ihe abnormal shortage of teachers--65'; ? of the 36,000
teachers were dismissed--was a direct result of the denazifi-
cation proceedings carried on by means of the highly publi-
cized questionnaire. The eight-page questionnaire forced
each teacher to lay "jare the events and the philosophies of
his entire life. Ke was asked to enumerate the or^.;anizations
,
secret and non-secret, of which he had been a mem.ber, to give
in detail his employment record, his different and varied
sources of incom-e, his writinj^s, his speeches, his church
affiliation, his m.ilitary record, his travel, and the methods
by which he had acquired his property. In addition to these
ff
jquestions, triere were I3I other questions to be ansv/ered. If
the teacher was a meruber of the l^iazi party or one of its
! affiliates, he was automatically renoved from the teaching
profession as a practitioner. Hitler had required his
teachers to be lueinbers of the Teachers' Leaprue (Lehrerbund)
on penalty of dismissal; therefore the automatic expulsion
rate was high. H.ie ansv/ers to the questions asked by the
questionnaire were evaluated by a board comprised of United
States Amy personnel who had lived in Germany before the
war, of displaced persons, and of C-eriiians v/hose sympathies
were unquestionably anti*^azi. ±he members of these boards
recommended to the local AMerican I.'ilitary Government Educa-
tional officer "dismissal," "discretionary dismissal," or
"re tention. "3 iiilitary Government in its denazification
policy realized that "a democratic teacher will work for dem.o-
cracy even under a dictatorship, while a Nasi will work for
totalitarianism even under the most liberal f^overmient and
curriculumi. "^-
A second wave of dismissals, v;hich cam.e several months
after the schools had been opened, caused especially heavy
casualties sivionr, the teachers of the hi^lier schools and
threatened the very existence of some of the universities and
colleges. The necessity'- of a second v/ave of dismissals was
3. L;any Germ.ans v/ere forced to fill out the questionnaire as
often as six times; therefore the- soon lost all respect for
it.
li. Fred riechinger, Harper ' s I.'-agazine , "battle for German
_
Youth," February 19bJ5
,
p. 1(32,
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based on the not-surprising discovery that many of the teach-
ers ;vho had cleverly worded their answers to the questions in
the questionnaire and had passed the bus^J" boards had really
rou::ht for llazi and militaristic ideologies before and during
Hitler's assumption of pov/er.
As the dismissal of G-erman teachers continued at a fairly
rapid rate of speed, the German authorities reluctantly called
on more and more helpers to carr^r on as rer^ular teachers.
Hiis decision to use helpers further affected the quality of
school instruction, because the helpers v/ere far from, prepared
to handle the lar-e classes foisted upon them. In all fair-
ness to the helpers, it must be admitted that even experienced
teachers cannot perform creditably v/hen there ere no jfceaching
materials, no textbooks, and no reference m.aterials, especi-
ally v/hen the:/ are asked to instruct as m.any as thirtj' to
forty hours a week. Tae teaching:; load of the helpers was
finall^^ cut to twent^r hours a week in 19' 1-7 • I-any of the
school assistants, sv/ept into German schools by the emergency,
resi,^-ned \7ithin a relatively short period of time to work
in other fields or to continue "oheir studies in hic-her insti-
tutions. In an effort to keep the most able helpers in the
schools, the Germ.an educational authorities have decided to
enroll them in various teacher trainin- institutions to enable
them to qualify as full -fie d.'-ied teachers in future years.
In the face of continued emergencies, the German educa-
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tional authorities v/ith the consent of I.^ilitary Governine mfc
hired secondary school teachers to teach in elementary schools
flying ar':ainst the strict Creman practice of naintainin,-' iron-
clad differentiations between elementary and secondary school
teachers. Possibly this action will lessen the jealous strife
which has always influenced the relationships between these
two ^croups. Hie secondary school teachers were available
for v/ork, because the reopening of the secondary schools
lar; ;ed behind the reopening of the elementary schools by sev-
eral months; hov/ever the advantage v/xhich the authorities
gained by using the secondary school teachers must have been
lost as soon as the secondary schools opened and claimed them.
In fact, the use of tliese teachers on a tem.porary basis and
their return to the higher level of instruction m.ust have com-
pounded the administrative headaches, instead of relieving
them..
To ease the teaching shortage, the Coordinating Comjr'.it-
tee of the Allied Control Authority issued a general rule-of-
thum.b measure b7/ which persons from other professions who
were willing to enter the teaching profession might be ac-
cepted. Of course, their general educational qualifications
had to be suitable, and their teaching had to be "in the
deiiocratic spirit." Tnose two prerequisites were m.eant to
exclude former members cf the Nazi Party and other fascist
organizations, as v;ell as former members of the C-erman armed
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forces and full-ti:ne leaders of the Hitler "^'outh i.icvement.
This policy did attract a number of professional men from other
fields into the teaching- profession, but the lov; salaries for
teachers, the lar-^e classes, and other considerations appar-
ently^ limited the scope and success of the policy.
In addition to the severe shorta,-^e of teac ers and the
low standard of teaching;;; contributed by the assistants, there
was another problem, to harass the . ilitary G-overnment and the
German educational authorities; narnxoly, the advanced ap:e of
the retained teachers. For the male teachers, the averacie
age was 55-60, for the virom.en teachers, som.ewhat less. Ihe
heavy teaching loads, combined with the advanced a.-t^e of most
of the teachers, further impaired the quality of school instruo--
tion. Losses of manyr school days because of the illness of
teachers and their constant requests for permission to retire
"vvere not uncommon. Ihe problem of replacin-' neaiily every one
of these teachers within a fev; short years ".vill be discussed
in another section and is a vital factor in a.nj discussion of
the G-erman schools, no¥/ and in the future. |i
Ihe situation in I.'annheim's schools as reported by G-eorre
T. Trial and r.:, F., Goldsmith will serve as an excellent case
history to emphasize the reneral (and s05netim.es difficult to
visualize) statements about the extent of the teacher shortage,
Yihen school reopened in Mannheim., there were only sixty-ei^-ht
teachers fl^ to teach about '/OOO students in the first four
grades, and there were only fifty classrooms ready for use.
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i.iany teachers who were not really "suitable/' as far as the
Questionnaire was concerned^ had to be used to reopen the
schools. Some children were able to attend classes for only
two hours a day because of the teacher shortage. Tot a satis-
f actor-/- situation. I'r. Trial and I-r. Goldsmith feel that,
despite Army claims to the contrary, the teachinr; shorta^re v/ill
continue for an absolute minimum of six years, even thou^'-h
married women are being accepted as teachers contrary to
lonp German custom,5
Coupled with the serious shorta^i^e of cualified teachers
was the serious shortage of "suitable" textbooks. vVhat had
Military Governriient done to provide replacements for the
m.illions of Nazi textbooks vmich everyone knew would have to
be scrapped? I.lore than a year before the final surrender of
•Germany, a group of American and ^ritish educators were formu-
latin- plans in re;^ard to texts for tlie German students. A
survey of pre-IIitler school texts revealed then to be superior
in several fields. 'Ihe German primer, for Instance, was replet(
with outstandingly excellent illustrations and well-chosen
passages for the edification and enjoym.ent of its readers.
The nreographj/" texts were also verj good. The Anglo-Am.erican
group of educa..:or3 found that the vast array of language
books tended to be excessively form.al and insipid. Ihe his-
tory books quite naturally stressed an extreme nationalism and
5. George T. Trial and ;;:.K. Goldsmith, Current his tor:/ , "he-
building Germany's Schools," August, I9I4.6, p. IQj..
f
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a i^lorification . ci-ii-a. .. -u- . _ nt. In 1937 ^ the fourth
year of iiazi rule, the republican books of the \/einiar period
v;ere replaced pn a wholesale basis by textbooks eriphasizing
and reemphasizing nationalisra, racialism, deification of Hit-
ler, and all the other shop-v/orn tenets of i.ational Socialist
ideolor-y. Leaflets were ,r;enerally appended to history texts to
prove that the G-reeks v/ere "aryans" and thus of the same stock
as the modern Ger?nans.
The An^;lo-American Commission decided, then, to reprint
Weimar texts, because it was felt that the Germans probably
would not feel the same high degree of repugnance to the Ger-
man-written texts of the familiar Weimar period that they
might feel toward textbooks v/ritten by Americans and British.
Copies of German texts were obtained in En^jland and from the
library of the Teachers' College, Columbia university. 6 Fy
agreement with the Control Commission for Germany { ''ritish
Element), printing began in Aachen and Bonn of a Ii.O,000 set
edition. In late spring, 19'!-5j a larger printinr- v;as completed
in "I'unich. helping to make over five million nev/ly printed
and old textbooks available to Germ.an pupils by the middle of
October. German authorities strained every energy to uncover
the relatively few pre-r.azi textbooks r.'hich had not l^een pulped
V'/ith the advent of the new i azi textbooks in 1937.
Military Government had to examine every textbook formerly
^* Monthly Report of the i.x'ilitary Governor, U.S. Zone , "Educa-
tion and l.elirion," No. 10,-20 iiay 19ij.6, p. 9.
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used in German schools and had to authorize its continued use
before plans for its reprinting could "je r.iade. I.iost of the
books submitted to the Ame-ricans by the Germans for certifica-
tion after examination v/ere reading texts. Of all the text-
bocks submitted for approval, the largest percentage of rejec-
tions fell on the history, geography, and arithmetic books
respectively. The German educators and administrators who sub-
mitted books for censorship did not bother to request the exam-
ination of books strongly suspected of being kazi; for that
reason, the percentage of rejections in relation to acceptance
v;as not high. Ihere is a great deal of reason to suspect that
the lo\/ percentage of rejections was indicative of the laxness
and sloth of I'llitp^r^r Govern?iient in tlie accomplishment of a
highly important task. By the spring of IQ^i'-j the censorship
phase was nearly over, because relativel;/ few textbooks re-
m.ained on the docket for examination. ^y that time all efforts
were being concentrated on meeting publishing goals for new
textbooks scheduled to be distributed to school children in
October of that year.
i-'or are the new textbooks as good as an enlightened peda-
gog would wish. llie German teachers who v/rote tlie new text-
books had little or no source m.aterial upon v;hich to ground
tiieir works, and as a result many of the so-called new text-
books are merely superficially revised .Veim.ar textbooks, Ihe
lack of source materials available to textbook
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writers v^as attributed to the limited functioninr; of the li-
braries, as a result of the e:rtreme v/ar destruction and the
r'azi burnings of many Crerraan and forei.^m books. Also, thc
Eazis refused to accunulate for popular perusal certain for-
ei^-n books and periodicals. vVnen the textbook v/riters v;ent
to the public or school libraries for material, they often
learned that the libraries' collections were void of many im-
portant books and magazines published after 1933. Military
GrOveriTT.ent officials found, then, that the mass of tlie new
books were lackinn in creativeness , in a scholarly background,
and, not surprisingly, in a iiodern political liberalism..
lb assure \/riters of new textbooks of a m.odicum of refer-
ence m.aterial, nine Curriculum and 'ibxtbook Centers were
gradually set up in several sections of the American Sone in
Germany. Hiese centers v/ere designed to be v/orkshops for
writers. Collections of reference books were assembled from
Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, in addition
to Am.erica.n books and m.atsrials, such as War Department
educational 'laruals. Armed forces Ins ti 'Irate books, and other
miscellaneous books and pamphlets from Special Service collec-
tions, r.ore im.portant than these contributions may be the
scientific literature, totaling over i-iOO tons, which the
Smithsonian Institution had endeavored to ship to Cfermany for
a long period of time. The requirement that these books had
to pass VH,uadripar ti te screening will undoubtedly keep them
out of G-erm.an hands for a long period of time.
fc
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Hie severe shortage of paper in the American Zone fur-
ther hindered tlie process of textbook publication and necessi-
tated at a Stu-tt^-^art conference of German administrators and
"-.Military G-overnment representatives the introouction of a
system of priorities for the publication of nev; textbooks.
In the first priority stood prii-rers, readers, and arithmetic
books, v/hereas in the last priority group v/ere music, natural
science, and .'^•eography books. Tne fi-^Hai allotment of paper
for educational uses v/as scaled down to seven hundred tons
for the second and third quarters of 19-1-6, an amount vmich
was insufficient to meet the publication quota of even the
first priority group. Even v;ith a system, of priorities, the
shortage of paper for all uses rvew' progressively m.ore alarm.-
inp: as the months of occupation passed. After the first full
year of the occupation, the supply of paper v/as estima-ted to
be less than one-tenth of the total am.ount necessary to m^eet
the requirements of '-erman schools. In som.e schools, as many
as six cnildren had to learn from the same textbook. Gre^ror
Ziemer reported^ ' on the basis of j^ersonal observation^
that one class of reader v/as being used in Bavaria by alm.ost
tv/o million school children of all elementary school a-es.
Tr/o years after the defeat of Germany, I.lilitary Govern-
ment reported that a total of eight-y-tv/o titles of school
books comprising a total of over tv/o million textbooks had
been distributed from, the printing presses. Unfortunately,
fc
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although the two million texthookn; seo-i to he an entirely im-
pressive fifure, one needs only to realize that there are
over tv/o million children in the elenentary schools alone;
therefore the first two years' publication is apparently
enou.ah to supply on an average of less than one book for every
schoolboy and school -irl , 7 One educational authority wrote
that he had not been in a single German classroom in vdiich
every child possessed a textbook. Certainly, our achievements
in textbook publication have been dismal.
Our pulpin-^ program did benefit the Clerman children in I
the \vay of school supplies, but it did arouse stronr politi-
cal animosities. On j'.;ay I3
,
19l\.6 , the Goordina tin/;: Council
of Allied i:ilitary G-overnment issued a directive calling for
the pulping of lar':e numbers of confiscated Lazi books.
Allied generals were to judge which books were to be destroyed.!
Naturally the scope and the extent of the directive was inter-
preted by each power in its own zone.. Some observers felt
that books containing only a rninim.um of Kazi material should
have been preserved for their valuableness as historical data,
Tlie Army did preserve copies of all i.azi books destroyed;
therefore scholarship will hot suffer. Hie hysterical out-
cries against pulping were t^goically as follows: "it (the
pulping of i\azi books) will convince most Germans that Allied
minds and methods are not much different from kazi m.inds and
7. Ibid , Composite Review, 1 !ay I9I1.6- 3O April I9I4-7 , p. 3.
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methods., .it vvill be d witch-hunting task on I.^ilitary Govern-
nent Y/hich cannot be dischar.-ed with di^-nity and v/isdom."3
Despite the lar^e ariiount of vocal opposition, the policy of
pulping: Tazi textbooks and other publications v/as carried out,
and the pulped books v/ere converted into sorely-needed note-
books and v;riting paper for the G-erraan school children.
The lack of plant facilities because of war damai-e and
requisition for other uses v/as a further tormentinr factor for
Military Govern-fient and the German educational officials to
contend with. The requisitioned school plants v/ere vitally
needed as quarters for American troops, for displaced persons,
or for the vast number of expellees from the East, as well as
for German administrative functions. These requirements v/ere
so essential as to preclude the possibility of the return of
many school buildin,'];s for many years to com.e, especially as
long as Germ.an construction remains at a complete standstill.
^Aliat did I'lilitary G-overnment do to reopen the secondary
schools?
Hie reopenln,'": of the secondary schools did not m.aterialize
as quickly as had the openin?;: of the elem.entary schools. Ihe
first secondary schools did not be.-sin to open until early in
I9I-I-6. From the vevj first day of the occupation, I.'ilitary
Governi-nent was most concerned about rem.ovinr: the youn^cer chil-
dren from, the streets at the first possible m.oment and sending
3. Editorial, Christian Centur:/
,
i'ay 29, I9I16, p. 67.
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them to school; jioreovor, : ilitary Government was vitally
and acutely conscious of certain additional problems inherent
in the operation of the German secondary schools.
All the frustrations, the disappointments, the compro-
mises i/hich torirented the adminis trato^.s of the elementary
schools plaque d the secondary -school admiinis trators too.
Qliese problems need not be rediscussed. One of the main
reasons for the retarded reopening date of all schools of
hirher education related to the military authorities' insis-
tence that these schools v/ere likely to be trouble spots
and required, therefore, a sharper surveillance of teachers
and students before being reopened. Military Governraent
educational officers realized that the teachers and students
had been literally pummeled by aggressive i'azi indoctrination
over a period of several years or m.ore , indoctrination not
easily to be eradicated and superseded by new, foreign-in-
spired doctrines.
On the other hand, the l onthly -^ -epor ts of the idlitary
Governor , U.S. '^one
,
reported blandly that relativel:/ little
was being done to educate teachers for secondary school \'/ork.
Instead of launching a sorely needed program .to recruit se-
condary school teachers, tlie educational authorities were
willing to hire representatives of other professions to supply
the instruction for which no regular teachers were available.
Teachers recruited in this vaanner could offer only disjointed
1^
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and spotty instruction, i ore i'l^portant, this expedient allowed
the educational boards to postpone their recruitrient of nev/
teachers and of first-class teacher candidates. Triis unenr
lightened policy of pos ti^onement and procrastination na^'
v«ell lead to disastrous consequences, both for idealistic
American plans and for the relatively sT-'.all nucleus of Cfernan
educators v/ho are coriiriitted heart and soul to a de^iocratic
future for Germany based on 'i-eriTian school leadership.
One incident ^--ay serve to delineate the possible results
of this shor t-sif:hted American policy. Late in 19^!-6, over
23,000 copies of the Hessian and American constitutions,
printed in the German language, were distributed to each
school in Eesse. jlie idea of making these constitutions
available to the G-erm.an school children for study and under-
standing was excellent. The individual attitude of each
teacher conditioned the value of a stu.dy of -bhese constitu-
tions, because a cynical, sneering reading and discussion of
these docum.ents by some of the teachers whose symp-^.thies re-
mained loyal to riazi ideolo-y rendered the study of these con-
stitutions not only useless, but actuall:/ pernicious to the
dem.ocratic cause. This sim.ple instance serves to illustrate
hov/ heavily I ilitary G-overnm.ent and the German educational
authorities^had to depend on the teachers to further their
political and educational objectives.
If the teacher rerr.ains thoroughly nazified, he is able to
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neutralize all American eiforts to reorient young German minds
and to preach lational Socialist doctrines in a backhanded,
difficul t- to-prevent manner, CTre^;or Ziemer knev/ of definite
cases in v;hich unreliable, improperly-screened teachers v/ere
able to spread Hitler's theories by means of insincere, hollov/
commendations of the de^'iocratic s^^stem.?*
It must be adm.itted that--on paper and as far as shallov;
statistics are concerned--I.Iili tary :3-overnm.en t attained nearly
complete efficiency in m.aintaininr the operations of all
schools on a hir:h quantitative level, but it did its own
cause immeasurable harm by its v/illinf-ness to compromise and
accept unreliable teachers, merely to keep the schools in full
operation, just as though the tierm.an schools were sim.ilar to
a manufacturing; plant. As long as I.iilitary Government is
v/illing to shrug its shoulders and say, "Yes, we know that
Herr Schm.idt is a Nazi, hut we can't ret anybody else," it is
contributing to the '-^radual deterioration of all educational
I
j
efforts, however adm.irable .
I
As a m.atter of record, there v/ere 221,512 secondary
I students in school bein<~ taught by 7j979 teachers, including
li m.ore than 1200 assistants in 19g-7» '-Q^e proportion of stf.dents
|i
j|
to teachers was about twent^r-.^even to one; -jet teaching aids,
j
textbooks, and su"o-olies re:'^ained so radically insufficient
J
that class schedules continued to limp along at a substandard
9. Gregor Ziemer, ffiie American i-.xercury , "Our Educational j'ail-
ure in Germany," June, 19i-|-6, pp. 726-73I4..
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level, IV/o or "lore schools v/ere often combined to make one
overcrowded school, an indicatdion of the continued severity
of plant unavailability,
Ihe seven universities and the numsrous technical schools
in tlie American Zone were sIoy/ to reopen, not because the
dama;i;e to plant facilities had been inordinately severe, but
because i'ilitary Government realized that the professional
and administrative classes had been educated in the universi-
ties almost without exception. In recent, lamented V/eima.r
i. iepublie day s , the universities, b o th G a tho 1 1 c and Pr o te s tan t
,
had been ITazi Bulv/arl:s . Althoupii American authorities ?/ere
exceedingly desirous of accompli shinr: a restitution of hifcher
G-erman education as soon as possible, they wished to select
the future leaders of C^rmany by carefully denying tlie ad-
mission of corrupting l\azi influences. After facult;r- student
committees had screened candidates according to Allied and
American directives, the faculties (usuallTy theological and
medical) were allowed to reopen to offer at first the American-
styled refresher courses and then to continue with regular
courses of study. Students who had completed part of their
college or universitjr training before tiie exi encies of the
war forced tlieir withdrawal, formed a large percentage of
the post-war student bodies, because they were nearer to gradu-
ation t.lian the other students, "ermanyg had and still "las
great need of their services.
rr
On January 23, Ipij-^ , a Four Pov/er Agreement established
definite cate'~:ories of unaccep tabilfls students for enroll.-^.snt
in institutions of hir:her learning;. ^e reception of this
directive necessitated the resubinission of all university and
college candidates to a second process of screening. Faculty
members were subjected to constant rescreening, because addi-
tional information about them -.vas being received from time to
time
.
"ij the sprin-; of 19-'-''S all universities "jeve partially
reopened with their pre-war "corporate autonomy" restored,
except for bombed-out Cliessen, which v;ill not reopen at all,
other than to offer a few courses in veterinary 'edicine.
Although there were more than 20,000 students attending
the ei^^-ht universities, more than 3,000 in the University'- of
lunich alone, the universities were not able to accept m.ore
than a fraction of the candidates v/ho sourht admission to
these institutions of hi-lier lea.rnin^-. There was, for that
reason, a stronn- reaction to a ruling vv'hich allowed displaced
persons to comprise ten percent of the total enrollm.ents , and
there was a grum.bling acceptance of the edict of the Cocrdina-
ing Comraittee v/hich condoned the acceptance of nom.inal ? azis
for university and college training, as long as the total did
not exceed ten percent. It must be realized that the accept-
ance of form.er Gerr.an Army officers contributed heavily to
the general debasement of the student bodies. Ihe officer-
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class in Weimar Republic days was a notoriously an ti -republi-
can "roup.
'I-ie universities v;ere subject to the same woes that ham-
pered all educational Institutions. In addition to serious
facult^r 3hortar:;es, the universities were i>npeded by a lack of
plant facilities, hj textbook shortages, by run-do\vn or use-
less technical equipment, by a lack of supplies of all kinds,
by the almost absolute non-existence of recreational opportani-
ties, and by a student housing shortac-e of the most desperate
nature. A few fi'-ures in rej;ard to the destruction of univer-
sit^r libraries will indicate the severity of the problem. Ihe
Universitvr of ilunich lost 620,000 of its one m.illion-book
library; i'"^rankfurt university lost 620,000 of its 700,000-
book library; Giessen, 90:> of all of its books. Also, the
physiolo.'-.ry and chem.istry laboratories of the University of
Ilunich were destroyed. 10 -^-^eidelberg was forced to discon-
tinue 50^000 student hours of lectures and discussions, be-
cause there was not a sin,i;le room available for larre groups.
All four colle.^es of en-ineerinr were reopened in due
course. Iheir resumption of activities had been feared and
j
therefore delayed, for there was no concrete plan to handle
the research activities of these collep^es. Ihe Allied Control
1 Council issued an order on April li-, 19-1-6, outlining: a reneral
program to control the research of the scientific colle';^es
10. i.'Ionthly Report of the Militaj?^^ Governor, U.S. Zone, "Edu-
cation and Relirion," Uo. 22, 1 "lay I9I1.6-3O April 19)!-?, p. 20.
r
so.
fron the point of viev/ of -.uaranteein' tiie liqj.i elation of the
Crerman war potential. Applications by technical colle,-:es
seekin'-; pernission to reopen were to proceed fron the Land Edu-
cation officer to the Chief Re'':ional educational officer of
!!ilitary C-overnment. Cf course, the colls res v;hich had re-
sumed their activities before the issuance of this general
policy v/ere forced to apply for permssion to reopen, Ihe law
pernitted the extension of tentative approval for coru'-.iencing
research activities subject to the submission of a petition
and separate reports of each project to a special research
con^-'iission to be created at a later date,
l.'ilitary Governiiient was greatly impressed by the evi-
dences of an insatiable appetite for learning and for detailed
::nowledge about other countries and events, about which
nearly all students in Crerman hir^her institutions felt an in-
comparable ignorance, Ihis interest in people and events
outside Germany prom.pted the students to clamor for a resti-
tution of the pre-v/ar, inter-nation student exchange; however
the acute transportation shortage has so far frustrated this
desire. Political forums and discussions based on historical,
political, and 30ciolo-"ical topics could have done :-iuch more
to launch Grerm.an students tcv/ard dem.ocratic thinking. Stu-
dent committees in each university have done m.uch to prom.ote
extra-curricula activities, to establish conjiections with
colleges and univer.sities within and v/ithout C-ermany.

'The universities have appeared to ?ecoine nore liberal and
de-Tiocratic by schedulinn; certain courses desired by liilitary
Governraen t; liowever, nost of then for one reason or another
are not offered. -Lhere v;ere at j'rankfurt, upon investigation,
no courses in sociolop:y, conparative literatare, or political
theory. Ihe professors feared tliese courses, for they real-
ized that few of tliem were prepared to handle these courses.
Germany's professors have been renowned as great scholars who
have chosen to detach theraselves from all political life and
most as-^.ociation v/it.h students outside the classroom. Ihe
professors seem, unable to change their ways. Tae universities
are still turning out specialized experts, but not educated
citizens. Observers have found the "^^erman lectures to be^ as
before^ stiff and formal and often boring o The new German pro-
fessors m.ust be inculcated with the feeling of responsibility
for the social and political growth of their students, not
m.erely for their bookish mental growth. 'Jhe present lack of
interest in politics is reflected in the fact that at the
Universi t^r of '.unich there v/ere only thirty r.embers out of
a total stu.dent body of 11,000 in the International Club.
The apathy of the Germ.an students m.ay be partially ex-
plained by the food ration. 'ihe average day's ration of a
Germ.an student at the bniversi t^r of J'rankfurt during the win-
ter of lQl'.r-lo''7
:
^111 rrams of bread ([;. slices)
7 " " fat
I
82,
215 grams of neat (l slice of sausan-e)
3 " " clieese
l/lO liter of skimr^ied nilk
17 prams of suf^ar (3 pieces)
l\.00 ^ " " potatoes (Ij.)
1|. " " ersatz coffee
Proof that American educational authorities are not in-
terested in broadenin,^ the base of G-erman education rmy be
found in the results of a survey of the University of Frank-
furt's student body. The distribution of scholars according
to social and economic rasasurement v/as a;oproxi:r.a tely the
sair.e as the distribution which had existed under previous
political regimes. Families of civil servants, professional
nen, and independent v/orkers contributed the m^ajority of the
students, although some of tiie students did come from the
"white collar" group. Hie wealthier p;roups comprised a large
percentage of the students as the.y did in Weimar Republic days
vvhen more than one- third of the students came from the upper
classes and much m.ore than one-half from, the middle classes.
H
Hie base of Cferman hirher education must be broadened to in-
clude m.ore than two to five percent of the lower v;orking
classes if democratic education is to have a "fi-hting
chance" for success.
The remaining im.portant educational ins ti tu.tions will be
grouped together for brief discussion. Both American and
G-erman educational leaders strove to resuscitate adult educa-
11. Franz Neumann, Behemoth
,
(New York, 19[|.2), p. 399.
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tion, v/hich the ITazis had perverted and operated throurh their
"Strenn;th throuf-h Joy" movement. Ihe first such school to re-
open under American supervision was the Frankfurt Association
for Adult Education, the oldest school of its kind in Germany.
In Iplj-?, there v/ere over 23,000 students from Wuer ttemberg-
Baden and over 30,000 adult etiadents from. Kesse.
Kost of the courses \/hich the adults (of '.7hich a large
percentage v/ere v/orien) v/ere s tudyinr: were practical or cult-
ural--s tenor:r aphy , hone econoinics, lan;;::ua<3e s , etc. For a
reason which no intslli.^;ent observer can co-mprehend, few
courses based on the social sciences have been offered. Since
the German mind was not trained durin^j the i'.'azi re;:vime to
think deeply about politics, administration, or forei'<:n rela-
tions, there was relatively little interest in these matters
when the adult educational program was launched, Military
Government, by not propagandizing and inciting:; interest in
the social sciences, overlooked a tremeddous force for making
a nev; Germany. Here ap:ain a lack of a plan and m.ilitary
inertia have combined to hobble the occupation's iirpact on
the people.
1V/0 very enccurar;in;^ aspects of adult education were
the participation of universities and their faculties in
the adult education program (though to a limited decree) and
the joint efforts of the two major religious groups and the
various political parties in community and Land education.
f
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The adult educational schools are not encumbered by vast
netv/orks of traditions; therefore these schools adapted them-
selves to democratic methods of free discussion to a far
£,reater extent than tiie elementary and secondary schools
succeeded in doin^.
If the adult educational program is ever goin^; to assume
its rightful position of importance, it v;ill need the advan-
ta^^^es of German public libraries. Ttie libraries suffered a
^-:reat deal as a result of the war, of lar.^e-scale removals,
and durir.i^; the T.'ational Socialist re£:iine from, the public burh-
in^:s of books alien to the Nazi philosophy. kotliin,^ could
contribute more toY;ard American success in G-ernany than a con-
crete plan to restock ?rerman library shelves, especially with
at least a m.odicum of social science books, the supply of
v/hich v/as and is fantastically insirnif icant.
In normal times, 92;j of all the boys and ';'irls in the
ik-lS year r:roup were vocational school students, either on
a full-tim.e or a part-time basis. By the spring- of ipLi?
,
som.e 31Uj325 studonta v/ere attending- these schools, ihe con-
centration of the Tiajority of these schools in urban areas
aEcounted for the relatively m.ore severe physical damage v/hich
these schools suffered durinr^ tiie war.
The agricultural schools suffered a 70;^ loss of teacher
personrel. "-Relatively fev/ students were attending ar'ricul-
tural schools. Boys in the advanced schools were allowed to
(
Pi
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attend one term. onl3^. Tne teacliers in the rural a^-ricul tural
schools were usually teachers who had been brou^'^ht up on farms
and were farilliar with '-eneral ap:ricul tural practices; where-
as the teachers of tlie advanced agricultural schools had to
be graduated from pedagogical institutions,
\¥hat are the educational policies of the .cr-ian Land
governments and how are the new teachers being trained? These
questions are vital. The I'inisters of Education of the Land
governments presented to I ilitary Govermient their educational
program.s for approval. Two divergent programs were formulated
by Ds". Schramii, L.inister of Education of Eesse and by Dr.
Fendt, .'inister of Education of Bavaria. I'oth program^s sour:ht
to extend educational privileges to children according to
their abilities, not according to ' • wealth, family back-
grounds, etc. Dr. Schramm's proposals placed the em.phasis of
eduaction on modern cultures; Dr. I'^endt's proposals, on the
traditional Ger'-.an classical tradition in the secondary
schools. Both envisioned the entry of superior students to
the university by way of vocational and adult schools, not
i
merely bv the usual method of relatively exoensive secondary
i
schools like tne Clymnasium. Only in Hesse, then, was free
j
education to be provided from the elementary school to the
university'- for deserving young students, subject to the Land's
power to charge the wealthy students fees. In Mayr, 19'!-7, the
i inistry of Education of Eesse issued an order to school
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officials to collect no further fees for tuition frori secon- •
dary and university students. Also, Dr. Schramn v/as instru-
mental in securing the ratification of a policy v.'hich all :
liberals will applaud; namely, the se ttinn- up of a 100,000
Reichsmark fund to assist university students v;ho had suffered
persecution on religious, racial, or political r^rounds. Ihe
school reform bills of all but Bavaria v/ere accepted by iV-ili-
taj?y G-overranent.
A paramount political-educational policy of the American
and --rerman educational leaders v/as to foster democratization
by encouraging cooperation betv/een the elementary and secondary
school teachers by iieans of teacher associations. The Uazis
forced all teachers to join one teachers' association (Lehrer-
bund) on a national scale; I'ilitary Governi-.-ient desired to
heal the breach by a dem.ocratic rapprochement to i?npr-ove Ger-
mian education. As lon,^ as elem.entary teachers continue to be
trained in special teachers' colle-'-es and the secondary school
teachers in universities, tliere v/ill be only a show of coopera-
tion betv/een the fevo groups, Every enlightened educator has
pressed for uniform trainin-, but it must be adm-itted that not
one concrete step has been taken in that direction. Ineffec-
tual discussions are not sufficient. Hie Bavarian Iinister
of Education has announced himself to be comxpletely opposed
to the plan, and the other ! inisters of Education are silent.
Education for teachers v/as recornized very early to be
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a -:ogt vital problem, both in the restricted field of Crerman
education and for Germany as a whole. Thir ty- U/o teachers'
collen-es, havin.g en enrollment of I4.OOO stu.dcnts, v/ere in opera-
tion in the spring- of 19^^-6, and 2000 of these stu.dents v/ere to
be ,c;radu.ated by the end of 19.'-|-6— a furtlier example of Ameri-
can streamlined education. IVas one year of preparation enou,;^h
to prepare teachers for their roles in a confused, leadership-
lackin,^: country like Ger^^any?
Host plans for teacher education call for a su:'.Tmary re-
turn to pre -Hitler form.s. Som.e r-roups feel that a tivo-year
prop-ram beyond tlie secondary school v;ill be sufficient; others
are requesting-; the complete adoption of the bavarian plan of
a five- or six-year norm.al school education after crraduation
from elementary school; still others envision a one-year pro-
f^ram- to follov/ o^raduation from secondary school.
But the form of these schools did not v/orry the authori-
ties nearly as much as the selection of the students for
teacher- trainin;; colle.^es. Ihe average a^e of the applicants
Y/as twen-b^'-four years of ar:e. Ihese applicants had been sub-
ject to a tliorour^h I.azi indoctrination, to the varied in-
fluences of the Hitler Youth pro,'7;ram, and to the attitudes of
the Hazi P:,^-rt2r m.embership. Since all youths v/ere Fazis of
the active or inactive kind, I'ilitary '^-overnment authorities
and the German authorities v/ere faced with the absolute ne-^
cessity of using some of these young people as teachinr; can-
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didates. Kany of these young people v/ere given brief indoctrin-
ation courses ( six-weeks), the value of i;h i 'i.:^'ears exceed-
ingly doubtful,
Some\;hat too glibly, i/ilitary Governi^ent expressed an
opinion that a reorientation of this generation v/ould not be
excessively difficult, provided tliat correct leadership was
supplied and provided that economic conditions were favorable
to the growth of new ideals. Ihls specious reasoning seems
to merit attack fron all quarters and shades of opinion.
Will these so-called redeemable Fazis be able to accon-
plish one of the occupation's most difficult and important
assirnm.ent , the reeducation for democracy of other ITazi-indoc-
trinated youths? Is this assicmment doomed to failure?
Just as many studer-ts of German education had predicted,
the Germ.an universities have so far shovm either lukewarm or
no interest whatever in the proposals of the Allied Control
Authorifr^r to establish higher pedagogical institutions closely
associated with the universities in order to train teachers
to staff teachers' colleges. It is desired that the teachers'
colleges concentrate on producing com.petent leaders in diversi-
fields of education-- teachers of education in colleges and
universities, school adminls trators--and in general do a much-
needed job of improving German educational methods, research,
and curricula.
The universities themselves have taken no positive steps
ii
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to train the newly-acquired members of their teachin?^ staffs^
or prospective instructors. Bie return on a temporary basis
of German professors v/ho v/ere driven from. C-ermany by the
LTazis and the exchange of C-erraan and American professors,
which afc- being debated, will do miuch to reacquaint present
professors in '-'erm.any with educational standards and practices
outside of Crermany. Durin~ the summer term of 19^-7 ^ ^ number
of Swiss and American guest lecturers spent some time in
C-erman universities trying to help the G-erm.ans to bridge the
gap betuveen Germany and the rest' of the world.
At the rate that new teachers are being trained and de-
nazified teachers are resuming their posts, '.ilitary C-overn-
m.ent predicts that there will be a sufficient pool of teachers
available in a year or two to fulfill requirem.ents , Ihe fact
tliat this goal is expected to be attained, even though large
nuFibers of teachers are resigning because of old age and sick-
ness, indicates that the reinstatement of teachers previously
considered politically unacceptable is m.cving at a fast pace.
Certainly the thirty-nine teachers' colleges are not
equipped to provide m.ore than a small proportion of the
number of teachers required. Again the Arm.y shows itself to
be more interested in restoring the Cxerman ship of- education
to a superficially even keel than in rebuildin';^ with newly-
trained -teachers i.ho v;ould give our dem.ocratic policies a
chance for ultimate victory in G-ermany,
4
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Vi/liat have j ilitary Governraent and the derman educational
administrators accomplished? In the vvinter of 1Q[\.S -19h^'
>
i'ilitary Government announced the following achievements:
"L'^Hie Laender Ministers of Education and
necessary school superin tendants have
been appointed for every position.
2. "nhe U.S. Control Elem.ent maintains corr->
plete supervision of the German educa-
tional system by the use of educational
specialist branches at the Land level,
3, "All educational personnel in tiie U.S.
Zone have received questionnaires,
"All Lazi and militaristic books and
teaching: materials have been removed
from the schools, Ey October 15, 19h-B
»
emergency textbooks were supplied for
elem^entar^r schools.
5. "All the schools which reopened were .•
forced to undergo a thorough purge of
curricula before perm.ission to reopen
was forthcom.ing.
6. "By February 1, 19k^ , 96< of the I937
total of elementary schools,- 65/3 of
all secondary schools,; and o5.7;-' of
all faculties at universities or insti-
tutions of similar rank v^ere either open
or authorized to reootn as sonn as
possible2l3
Yes, 1-ilitary Government has restored the form of German
education.
Ihe spirit has not changed, though, lhat Military Gov-
ernjr.ient has a long, road to travel to incorporate a democratic
spirit in+othe schools may be rleaned from the scope of the
recommendations of the Zook Comjnittee. In August, 191.6, '-'::r 3
13. iAonthly l^eport of "the Ivlilitary Goigernor , U.S. Zone , "Educa-
tlonT^Heligion, and Public V/elfare," Ifo. 7 , 20 February Il6,p.7
i
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George ?. Zook, President of the Am=;rican Council on Education
brou^-ht a f^roup of professional educators fror. the Lnited
States to F.ake a survey of the German educational scene and
to make reports. Sone of the main recormnenda tions embodied
in the Report of the U . S . '3duc a ti on I "i s s i on to Germany were
as follows
:
"1. "A com.prehen^ive school system for all
children and 7/-outh be lev/ the university;-
level be developed in the U.S. Zone of
Germany;
2, "All children rem.ain to^^ether for six
years in the elem.entary school v/i'-hout
bein- ser^re.r-ated accordin.r to sex, soc-
ial class, race, vocational, or profes-
sional intentions;
3. "Hie v/hole school pro.^ran make a sig-
dificant contribution to dem.ocratic
experience
;
k. "Additional time needed for social
studies and cultural subjects be pro-
vided in the schedule of the vocation-
al schools:
5. "Special help in the v/ay of :naterials
and consultants be provided the *^^erm.an
i.'inis tries in writing textbooks and in
plannin,^ curricula;
6. "Efforts be made to aid libraries and to
secure adequate teachinr aids such as
firms, m.aps, globes, and the like;
7. "A vigorous program of leadership train-
ing be undertaken with youhg adults who
are potential advisers to youth groups
and that youth com::iittees on kreis and
Land levels extend their v/ork in estab-
lishing new groups and in leadership
training;
"A large number of young German teachers
I(J
02
aPxcl stiidGnts be sent to America Tor the
purpoT-e of s tijicly and reeducation alor --
democratic lines. "ill-
One or two concrete examples v/ill serve to illustrate
v;hat the Zook Co^inr.i ttee report see]ns to emphasize-- the laclc
of spirit to attain the democratic educational ,r;oals. The
Bavarian Minister of Education (the same one v/ho refuses to
allov.' women teachers to teach boys) issued an order v/hich
clearly violated the spirit of dem-Ocratic education. Accord-
ing to the lav/, all teachers of non-Bavarian ori'^in were to
be barred from giving instruction in that Land, I;a*urally
and wisely, Military Government was forced to order the
m.inister to rescind his ruling on the basis of the teacher
shortage and because of the heavy influx of Germ.ans from
other sections of G-ermany, as well as from olher countries
like Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, etc.. Hie main reason
for forcing a rescission of that order-- that it was undemo-
cratic and irri taticiial and opposed to all American efforts,
hov/ever ineffectual, to eli.ininate petty edticational squabbles
and certain tendencies to break off into narrow, uncoopera-
tive units--was not even mentioned by illitary Governm.ent,
perhaps for political reasons, Ttie Germian authorities have
"obstructed, opposed, and whittled down" the creation of
school reform.s of all kinds because the unification of the
school S3'"stem. and other reform.s would tend to lower their
l)-!-. Ibid, "Education and religion," (Gurnulative Reviev/), No,
22, 1 miay I9I16-3O April 19^7, P. 3*
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"hip.:h standards. "15
On the hi;:her education level, Erlanr^on authorities de-
bated x'or months the dosirabili t^r of adnittin,^: v/orkin:-:- class
youths v/ho ,o-ave evidence of special proclivities for univer-
sity^ training, but who could not present the reciuired educa-
tional backQ;rounds . ITo tiling;, so far as is Icnown, ever came
of that sur::~e3 tion. ijJrlangen was the last G-erman university'-
in the American Zone to establish a "Senate," the rulin?;: body
of an institution of higher learning according to long German
practice, 'Ihe Germans v/ill not widen the educational base un-
less they are subject to strong external pressures.
In many classrooms, vi;ro te one observer, there y;ere "no
textbooks, no spontaneous discussion, no free play of queST
tions and answers, no exchange of ideas. "1^ Because there
appears to be in Germany such a profound ignorance of what
constitutes democratic procedure, it seer.s wise for L'ilitary
Government to encourage policy-making officials in the United
States to allov; the return to Germany of former German pro-
fessors who desire to contribute their bit to the restitution
of an adequate educational progrtun. In addition, those Ameri-
can professors and teachers who feel a desire to contribute
their services to the Germ.an prorrram should be be encouraged
15« Fred K, Hechinger, riarper's I.Cagazine, "oattle for German
Youth," February ipl+S, p. Icili-.
16, George Ziem.er, Amierican :..ercur7/, "Cur Educational Failure
in Ger:-:any," June, 19i|-6, p. 726,
ii
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to do so.
As the months and years of the occupation pass, the total
number of students increase, because the population is becom-
ing more stabilized to ilie extent that the parents are re turn-
inr: their children to the classrooms in increasing numbers.
Also the ranks of school children are being sv/ollen by tlie
large numbers of German expellees from Auctria, GzechoslQvaliia,
and Poland. I'ilitary ;jOvernment reports nov/ state that more
schools are in tem.porary q.uarters tha/lpreviously . Ihe in-
creased enrollment has not been matched by a com.parable in-
crease of plant facilities, Hiere is, of course, almost no
new cons tru c tion
»
Ihe new directive concerning i-ilitary Governiaent, vjhich
on July 11, l?I;-7, superseded the old "jcs 1067," contained
tv/o paragraphs further defining Am.erican educational policies
in G-erm.any:
23, 'Education
a. "In recognition of the fact that evil
consequences to all free m.en flow from
tlie suppression and corruption of truth
and that education is a prim,ary means of .
creating a democratic and peaceful Ger-
many, you will continue to encourage and
assist in the development of educational
m.ethods, institutions, pro-'ram^s and mat-
erials designed to further tlie creation
of democratic attitudes and practices
throu'~:h education. You will require the
Germ.an Laender authorities to adopt a.nd
execute educational program.s designed to
develop a healthy, democratic educational
system which will offer equal opportunity
to all according to their qualifications.
i
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b. "You v/ill continue to e€±ect the com-
plete elimination of all ^'^ational Soci-
alistic, militaristic and a^f^Tre ssively
nationalistic influences, practices and
teachinrs from the Germ.an educational i
system. '"'17
In December, ipli-?
,
I.-ilitary Cfcvernm.ent took another
,l
weak step for\'/ard. It accujnulated tv/o -lillion marks for
periodicals and m.aterials for the Curriculum and Ifextbook Cen-
ters, for tlie publication of educational bulletins and periodi-
cals, for "grants-in-aid" to certain institutions for "reori-
entation" accordin- to tiie nexi denocratic plans, for scholar-
ships and fellov/ships for prom.ising students, and for tlie use
of technical assistants and consultants within the educational
system, of Germ.any.
To sum up the educational situation, a person is first
struck by the totality of indirect rule. Each Land has its
ovm constitution, its own parliam.ent, and its ov/n '/inistry
of Education, 7;hich is , in actuality, in almost complete
char:?;e of educational policies. V/hat pov/er 1 ilitary 'Tovern-
ment has is or the Land level, for lower echelons merel^r
"observe, analyze, and report" to the Land : ".ilitary rovern-
ment. In other words, the Germans seem to possess the out-
ward form of dem.ocracy in education, but the spirit, which
m.ust lie within the hearts and rrdnds of the Clerman psople,
has not been created, Vlor can it be created b^^ m.ere observation.!
Ihe paltriness of the American accompli^hjients in
17. Foreicn Affairs Outline s , "Buildin-=- tlie Peace," Depart-
ment~or atate
.
i.o. ii . pi.2/T '- "^".
4
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educ^ition is a source Ox" cci'L tlr:.;ir_ ai^iazenent to all obser-
I
vers, because it ap.)arentl37- indicates a lack of under s tandin,r^
!
of how much the United States has at sta]:e in the "reeducation'
of Germany.
"The moral and intellectual problem is, however, diffi-
cult and involved. It consists of creatinr conditions for
democrac^r in a youth that has not known it, does not parti-
cularly want it, does not have teachers with the spirit of
democracy, and lives in an environment unpropitious to demo-
cracy. "^'^ In the schools, "there is no authorit^r, no spirit,
no conviction, no heart in the under taking;. "-^^ Hie im.pulse
to learn for many sjfcudents is very weak after twelve years of
rTazism. r.:any students have sought despair and cynicism as
their only refuse* Ihey realize that their teachers are in-
adequate and that the new- authorities have ~iven them, no new
convictions to replace the old. i'ihilism and existentialism
are for many the philosophies of the day.
iv'.any of the teachers and students whose hearts are with
L'ilitary 3overnment in its fight for a change from, the old
ways dare not support us, because the^r have the ^ound fear
that the end of the occupation will coincide with their
defeat. V/e are not v/injning the teachers to fi'-ht for our
educational ideals, nor are we succeeding in winning the
lo. Franz Neumann, Gom;aentary, "Reeduca tin'-'- the Oer'-.ans ,
"
June, I9I1-7, p. 517.
19. G-regor Ziemer, op. cit., p. 72?.
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studonts to a Tull effort to apply our reforms. 20 v/e must
T:rovide the tools If our democratic education is to succeed,
IVe must challen.^e the 2^outh if v;e axpect to capture their
hearts and m.inds, and vie must help students so that they do
not have to take notes for t.venty-on^ other students (because
of the shortage of notebook paper) in a drafter, poorly illumin-
ated room-.
It seems evident that Americans are unable to agree on
the t;^rpe of education and the t^^pe of Germ-any which v;e v/ish
to see arise. 'A^e have not set a policy cohcernin:? the subject
m.atter to be taught; we have no real, enern:etic plan to v/in
over the younn; people in the schools; v/e have not attracted
into rilitary Government adm.inis tration capable Am.ericans who
have the intelli.:;ence and the foresi~ht to convert .'Teneral,
all-inclusive directives into prar-m.atic action. We have not
insisted on the or^^anlza tion of Gernan school life to pro-
vide experience in n;enuine
,
cooperative living, such as
student clubs, discussion groups, classroom comnl ttees , etc#
A roll call of Am.erican inadequacies in 'German education is
enlig:ite?-inr; and discouraging.
A large number of people feel that a part of our planning
should include a method of breaking down Germ.an isolation in
all matters, educational or otherwise. "Above all, Germans
20. W. Priedm.ann, I-'or tni 'htly
,
".llitarj Government of Gzer-
many," i.Iay Iplj.?, p. 329.

need a ray of hope as v;ell as a sense of firm and purposeful
<^uidance. Germans must a^ain become Europeans • "21
21. Ibid.
(
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Since the conditions v/hich I'.alitary Government round v/hen
f G-er:Tian was first occupied have been discussed, this section
v/ill do little more than outline what has been done in re.'i^ard
to the German inf orr^ia tional services.
As Y/ith political parties, Mlitar^r Government decreed
a complete absence of all activit^r by the Germans, Printed
inaterial could neither be published nor distributed. In order
to reopen, printers and booJis^llers had to register v/ith the
occupational forces, v/heroas publishers v.-ere required to '
obtain licenses. !
Ihe process of reristerinf? was relative li'- simple. After
the regular questionnaire and application had been filled out
and filed v;ith the local Tilitarv Governz-^ien t unit, there was
a period of delay v/hile ^-ilitary Governm.ent authorities tried
to decide whether the applicant's political record v/as clean.
If his record was satisfactory, the aioplicant v/as granted
a registration certificate subject to later review by Publi-
cations Control.
I
Ihe licensing procedure, on the other hand, was much '
slower and more rigorous. Ihe petitioning publisher had to
file tliree I.'iilitary Governm:Bnt questionnaires and three busi-
ness and perional questionnaires of a rather detailed nature
for consideration by Publications Control, If the publisher's
record managed to survive this phase of the procedure, the
publisher himself v/as called before the Publications Control
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i
officer, v/ho interviev/ed him ^ind asked him to -submit a pub-
i
lishirifj- pror^rani for- the cominn: year. Exact titles of books
!j
had to be na"ed. The Intelli,^ence "ranch then took charge
of proceedin.^s and interviewed the candidate and his refer-
ences. If the officials of both rublications Control and
I
Intelligence agreed that the publisher was acceptable, he was
' recommended to the com-^^.andinr officer of the Information
i Control Division, uho issued a license, unless there were
la s t-m.inu te ob j e c ti ons
.
In spite of the com.plicated procedure, three hundred
publishers were licensed to produce 'j.OO books a.nd pamphlets
and 50 periodicals, usually in units of ^000 copies each,
without prior censorship. Sometim.es, oversized printin.^s
for books with "hi n^h- educational potentialities" v/ere
allowed upon special application to lilitary Government; how-
ever such printin-jcs were rape; for, althouf-h the American Zone
has several larj^e paper mills, it does not have the necessary
chemicals to fill even m.inimum publishing requirements.
,
i-ilitary Government tried to keep three principles in
j
mind: l) keep the I^Jazis from publishing anything;; 2) rive 1
publishing ri'-hts first to those \i'ho had been closed down by
the i'azis; and 3) try to tie the books and the purposes of
the occupation together. 2 In fulfilling these principles,
1. 'Felix Re ichmann. Pub 1 i sher s ' Weekly , Tovember I6, 1q1l6, I
pp. 2310-2311.
2. Ibid
, p. 2312.
^1
i
102.
Military Croverni.ient decided to move slov/ly in r^rantinr^ publish-
iri'-: ri.^hts before reliable employees could be found whose s^'tti-
S pathies for democratic ::etliods would be unque s'tioned.
Durinr; the first months of the occupation, Military Gov-
err-inent disseminated news throu^'h its ovm newspapers; but by
the end of 19'^-^
,
only one united States-published ne^y/spaper,
Die Eeue Zeitunp- , remained in circulation. Ihat one paper v/as
to be continued indefinitely to explain to the Germans the
policies and the acts of the occupyinfi forces.
By fall of 19' 1-5 > :'ilitary Government contrived to create
a German newsQatherin^ ardency, DAITA, (later chan-^'ed to DEKA),
which contrived to train its "clean" personnel according to
policies set down by i.'ilitary Goverrmient. Hiere was no pre-
publication censorship, ..ilitary Gove rn'-'-ient has tried to show
the editors hov; to keep -their news and editorials separate as
in Anf];lo-Saxon countries. Ihe m.ilitary also attempted to
teach the Gerjiian editors to label the source of tlie nev;s and
to identify political "handouts." Ihe early life of DA'.'A was
replete with legal difficulties, because its practices v/ere
bound to conflict with, the Trading v/i th the Enemy Act. After
the legal difficulties were cleared, DAr;A was permitted to
buy and sell news to other news arencies.
oy x^'ehruary, 19^6, there were fr.venty-nine licensed nev/s-
papers in the United States Zone, issuinr; over four r.illion
copies of nev/spapers , or one for every five Germ.ans . The news-
papers then and now appeared on the street either two or three
i
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times a week and are often no -^-Oi^-o u aj. r-ovlaticr.s c..; ve.TU-
|
lar papers, four page.s in len^-^th, Tlilitapy Governnient has ;
repeatedly emphasized the many difficulties to be overcome
in "educating" the German informational media, partly because
the previously-mentioned lack of newspaper and nev/sprint^
partly because of the lack of equipment and space; partly be-
cause here especially did the Nazis contaminate' and partly
because personnel problems are especially severe, since in-
form.ation propagation was a favorite I'Tazi tool for the sub-
jura tion of others and the Nazis made every effort to ferret
out the lukev/arm: adherents to National Socialism. If an ap-
plicant for a nev/3paper job had been a party member, he v/as
so?;ne tim.es used by F.ilitary Government in non-executive or
non-creative capacities; if an applicant had been an active
party m.ember, he was allowed to perform no thin;: more than
ordinary labor.
Onl^r July 1, ly'-!- , "alitar^r G-overrcnent turned the li-
censing procedure over to special Land licensing offices with
the admonition to heed the following criteria in issuing li-
censes :
"Applicant must give an account of his personal and poli-
tical career, e specially?- as a journalist or publisher to show '
he v/ill cooperate positively in building a democratic G-er-
many."3 Ne m.us t display high qualities of character and
3. Monthly Report of the Tiilitary Governor, U.S. Zone, "Infor-
mational Control," No. 10, 20 Kay I9I1-6, p. 2.

io).i.;
leadership, be professionally able, be unobjectionable as
far as his private economic situation is concerned, and pled,^e
not to use his paper to further the selfish interests of a
privileged ^roup.
In October, 19l\.6 , Directive l^o. 4O , "Policy to be .'ollowed
by G-erman Politicians and the C-ernan Press," amended existing
rules and permitted the development of free discussion of Cfer-
man political problems, ^^om.o comment on the policy of the
occupyin- nations, and the dissemination of factual informia-
tion about v;orld events unless the statem.ents contribute to
a spread of "nationalistic, pan-Crerm.an, militarist, fascist,
or anti-demiocratic ideas spread rum.ors attempting to dis-
rupt unity arnon.Q; the Allied nations, incite distrust and
hostility toward any of the 3i^ Four, criticize decisions born
in Allied conferences on Germany, or appeal to the Germans
to act against dem.ocratic m.easures tahen by the respective
zone commianders. lb administer the lav/, a Press Council,
appointed by the Land's : linis ter-President upon nominations
received from the political parties, professional organiza-
tions, and from, tlie govern::ients of the Laender Ihem.selves
.
According to the lav/, the editor of each paper v/as r.:ade re-
sponsible for the articles v/hich he published, Llie Press Law
v/as to lapse after the nev/ Landtags of the three Laender had
form.ulated satisfactory lav/s of their own,
'ihe change of the United States 's official policy to- '<
ward Germ.any in cultural affairs was made knov/n in a
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directive issued, on July 11, 19-i-7 • Section 22, entitled
"Cultural Objectives," Section 26 entitled "Public Informationj
and Section 27 entitled "liees tablishnen t of International
Cultural Ilelcitions" are quoted:
22. "Your Government holds that the reedu-
cation of the G-erman people is an inte-
gral part of policies intended to help
develop a democratic form of rolorermien
t
and to restore a stable and peaceful eco-
nomy; it believes that there should be no
forcible break in the cultural unity of
Crermany, but recornizes the spiritual
value of the rep:ional traditions of fjer-
many and wishes to foster them; it is con-
vinced tnat the m.anner and purposes of
the reconstruction of the national Gernan
culture have vital si:;nif icance for the
fu ture of G-ermany •
"It is, therefore, of the hip-he st import-
ance that you make every effort to se-
cure maximum, coordination between the
occupying powers of cultural objectives
designed to serve the cause of peace.
You v/ill encourage German initiative
and responsible participation in this
v/ork of cultural reconstruction and
you will expedite the establishment of
these international cultural relations,
v/hich will overcome the spiritual isola-
tion imposed by National Socialism, on
Germany and further tlie assimilation of
the G-erman people into the world comj;un-
i t^r of nations.
26. a. "You will, in ths United States Area of
Occupation, supervise, encourage and as-
sist in the development by the Germans of
media of public inform.ation designed to
advance the political and cultural ob-
jectives stated in this directive.
b."You v/ill arrange tlirough the Allied
Control Council for the implem.enta tion
of the decisions of 23 April ipli-? of tiie
Council of Foreign Ministers on the free
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exchange of in.Vor-.iiation and cio'-iocra tic
ideas by all Tiedia in all of "rermany,
c."You vvill develop and ^:aintaln or,';ani-
zations and facilities for the opera-
tion of media of information, including
those sponsored by Iiilitary G-overninent,
desi,r;ned to further the objectives of
your Governr.ient,
27, "In furtherance of the pro^Tram of the
reorientation of the German people and
the revival of international cultural
relations, you will permit and assist
the travel into and out of Germany of
persons useful to this pro^^ram v;ithin
the availability of your facilities.
You v/ill also perm-it and assist, to the
extent of your facilities, the free
flov; of cultural materials to and from.
Gerriiany . "Li
Iiilitary Governj-nent encountered powerful opposition from
former Nazis v/ho owned m.ost of tlie printing establishments
and refused to rent them, to "clean" Germans, licensed by Mili-
tary Government. Because this impasse be,'-.•an to threaten the
existence of the licensed publishers, Lilitary Government was
forced to step in and force the recalcitrant Germans to lease
their properties for five years. If, at the end of the five-
year period, the publishers still do not succeed in finding
printin," plants, Lilitary Govern:"ent v/ill arbitarily extend
the leases for another three years.
-he attacks on the United States and the I'arshall Plan
by Russia became so severe in October, lS*'-!-7 , that the United
States hilitary Government decided to launch an educational
[|.. l''oreio;,n Affairs Outlines , "Buildin'j ihe Peace," Department
of State, No, 11, pp. 20-23, 2?.
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and informational pro^;ram to explain to the Gorman people tlie
basic concepts of dem.ocracy as contrasted with communism,
li The United States-licensed af-encics were not as]:ed to enter
ii
li the -Dropar-anda jousts, but 'rany of thorn did voluntarily,
i;
I
Since the booksellers and printers did not have to wade
I
throun;h very much red tape, the^r were repastered and allowed
to operate in ".luch lar-er numbers-- som.e 2500 of them within
I
the first oirht months. lever theless , there v/ere in the first
ij year of the occupation very few books to be purchased,
t
Ihe Am.erican I.ilitary Governruent decided at first to
burn all the r.azi books, but there arose such an outcry an;ains1
this typically ITazi expedient, both fro:-:i the Germans in ^er-
m.any and the Am.ericans in the United States, that the final
decision was to pulp the books for writin,';^ materials for the
German school children. Ohe Kazi books v/hich the Germans
held in their private hom.e libraries were at first threatened
with seizure, but finally not removed. Over 2200 ierm.an
'l
authors have been banned in Germ.any; therefore the constant
raidin- of bookstores and libraries has caused much bad
:l
feeling and many serious American blunders,
Somie of -the new books which appeared in I9L1.6 v/ere
question of Guilt by K. Jasper, Soldiers of the U'oor by '.Yolf-
gan,^ Langhoff , Moabit Sonnets by A. haushofer who was shot by
the Uazis, and God in the Concentration Gamp by Uurt Walter.
Som.e of the American books transl?. ted into German N^e/O
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:-eavenly City c- u Eighteenth Century Philosopher by Carl
j
Becker, George Y/ashinr:ton Carver by Fiac]€ham iiolt, America : by i
Stephen Vincent /;enet, fhe 1:0 ad to [feheran by I'oster ?i. Dulles,'
One Iv'an's Teat by E.3. 'jvliite, fflie American Character by D.V.
j
Brogan.,- Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory by E.R, Stettinius,
and Majority Rule and I inority Kinhts by Kenry CoLiinanger , etc,
3j the end of 19.1|-'-'* 2l65 books and 23O periodicals appearing
regularly on the newsstands had been published.
In the magazine field, i'.ilitary Government has been
producing three magazines of its ov;n and allowing licensed
magazine publishers to print others. d ay (Heute ) , which at
first featu.red Ger-:ian guilt and received German indifference,
is a news and picture magazine; ffiie Am.erican Observer ( Bie
Amerikanische Rund schau) is supposed to reflect serious
Am.erican tho:a.^-ht; and the kev/ Gleam ( Die keue Auflese ) is a
di';::est of literary and v/orld news articles, published in con-
junction with tlie British— these are tiie AKierican- sponsored
magazines. Hie German magazines published and sponsored by
•;'er:Tians reflect the many and varied interests of the u-erm.an
people. i. agazines dealing with religion and T ~'c:--t tv;o of
the :most com: ion on the newsstands.
er^p.any is experiencin;;
,
then, a deluge of periodicals
unprecedented elsewhere, but many publishers say that wkJcW is
being written is inferior--at least so far,
xhe United S^bates contributed very little to the re-
3um:Dtion of film production, a vitally necessary tool for the
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reorientation of German tliOLviit. - any oT iiie pre-war German
filr. -Btiidios v;ere in the I'^ussian Zone, and so the United
States did not \v0rr7 very inuch about producinfr films. Hie
British and the Americans did combine to produce and distri-
bute a weekly nev/sreel, Ihe 'nVorld in Film , v;hich was rather
coldly received by the Germans-- too partial to the Allied
"camp. Some of the American films which were riven American
subtitles and shown to the Germans v;ere The Ziegfeld "^rirls
.
Suspicion , Ihe Keys of the Kinrdom , You C an ' t Take i t wi th
You, All This and ?Ieaven Too , Lo^iis Pasteur , Our Town , Holi -
day Tnn , Random h arve s t , Goin-^ m.y V/ay , and many more, ?y
r..aroh, 19'-'?, over QOO theaters were presenting film produc*
tions,
Julian Fach recounts an incident that serves to illus-
trate that the American film policy has not always been
perspicacious. One film that was presented to the Germans
depicted a ^-erman submarine crew machine -gunnin^^ the survi-
vors of a torpedoed merchantman. That scene caused a great
of displeasure, for no self -re.'^pec ting audience would tolerate
a film showing its people to be cold-blooded Irillers,.^
In L.ay, 19hl > "two years after the beginning of the
occupation, work v;as begun on a German film production en-
titled Between Yesterday and Tomorrow in I.':unich. Tlipre can
be no argument that the democratizing influence of one indi-
genou3ly_2roduced_film_will wield a £:reater influence over
5. Julian Bach, America's Germany
,
(Kev/ York, 19[l6), p, 230,
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"e .r rn.an i i :i n ' i i - ^ i n ill many f ore i ij-n films.
American documentary films have been highly praised, both
by n-ermans anri Americans.
Durin'-; the first v-ear of the occupation, lailitary Govern-
ment failed to do much of a propap-andizinp- job via the radio.
The 16'^, 7 00 G-erman radio o-.vners in the U.S. Zone v/ere ,^iven
some unsubstantial reorientation materials, including popular
music "to combat Dr. GoebbtLs ' campain;n a^^ainst foreign popular
music." Hie radio did play an active part in the 19)1-6 elec-
tions, for it did present th'^ candidates and their policies
to the people.
As th" months passed, however, i.alitary Government beran
to plan some of the radio prop:rams around the vital problems
of postwar ^Jermany. Ihere v;as a genuine attempt to encourage
round-table discussions and to encourage'^^^wn Meeting kind
of program to explain denazification, a free press, the
Geneva T'rade Conference, etc.
However, in the constant broadcasting of one of the
biggest shows in all of Germany, Military Government made the
mistake of overplaying the Nuremberg Trials, German guilt
and criminal acts v/ere dwelled on so constantly as to cause \
a distinctly negative reaction. In fact, because of the Luremf
be>-- Ti?ials and for otiier reasons, most Germans have become
convinced of the guilt of the Nazi leaders, but not of the
system as a whole, the important concept.

liilitary C-overnment in its Freedom vs. Totalitarianism
j series, -oresented in conjunction with the newspaper campaign
[I to nullify the effects of ^^ilitant corriunist propa.'^-anda,
|! began with three talks entitled "The P^ace of Labor Unions
in a Free Society," "The Hole of the Political Party in the
Democratic State," "^nd "Non-political Orr-'^niza tions in a Free
Society." The local radio stations discussed these and simi-
lar tooics on a local level.
il
'' The establishment of American Libraries of Information,
star tin- in the first Year in Stutt-art, Berlin, Hunich, and
'
.^'ranV-fu^t
,
helped the United States to tell its s to^y to the
Germans and to open the West to the Germans ac^ain after twelve
|j
years of i-i tier's Iron Curtain, In addition to the readin,c^
|[
room.s open to the pu.blic, there are reference roomxS made
1 available to licensed editors, script writers, clerrymen,
|;
teachers, and other professional people. Unfortunately, most
I of the books are written in En'^-lish. Althou~h the idea of
i these libraries is excellent, it has not been expanded nearly
enou'^h. In July, 19''7, there were about 700 books in circu-
lation from each of the tv/enty libraries or cenffeers as they
! were later named. Such a minuscule distribution of books will
scarcely rouse over seventeen million Germans.
Ihe drama in Germ.any has under rone a tremendous .growth.
Buildin-TS to act as theat-^rs were araon^^ the first to be re-
paired. American plays like Our Tovm, The Skin of Your Teeth
,
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Cn i^-orrowed Time , llnunder Rock , Hiree lien on a Horse, and
many others have become very popular. The output, of indip;en-
ous Crerm.an plays is still small,
i| Effective l.'ay 3I, ipl-l-? , I«:ilitary '"overn rent suspended
' the requirement of re,n;i stration for conductors, directors,
jl s ta.se manap-ers, dramatizers, stage designers, performers,
l|
'! and chiefs of theater departments. Special political stan-
dards remain only for key personnel.
If a person ^;v-ere forced to name the ^neatest obstacle
in the path of '.'ilitary ^-ovf^rnm.ent to reorient the '^-ermans
jl
accordins- to ignited States plans, the obstacle named would
1! undoubtedly be the paper shorta,a:e. Ihe forty-four licensed
I
newspapers still publish only two or three times a week,
I
except in Berlin where the competition between East and West
has produced a galaxy of nev/spapers. taper requirements for
I
books and m.agazines can be satisfied only 20"^^ by the amount
of paper available. Bad weather, and a world shortage of
:
cellulose, coal, e.nd transport have consoired to restrict
tj
3 3 1
the amount of foreio-n paper available fo-'^ puj^chase
I
'-'ei^y little is bein';" accomplished in the way of crivinf;;'
! Germany the rin-ht books, Instead^the wron~: books have been
banned, Tne radio, moving pictures, nev/spapers, and lectu.res
I
are not satisfactory substitutes for books which can be care-
fully read, studied, and discussed before beinT passed on to
friends, Ihere should be somethin.p- done to p-et the ripht
6. vVeekly Information Bulletin
,
No. 67/7, April , IpiiJ , p. h,.
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books into German libraries where they can b'^ available for
all. ^rer:iiany must have her eyes opened to the outside world,
if she is to overcome her gropin'^, unsure ways. For instance,
at the famous Heidelberf^ Historical Seminar, there has not
been received one sinfzle issue of any American hi=!torical
,'ourhal since I039.' The 'l-ermans must be allowed to possess
some criteria by vv'-hich they can adjust their new tiiou.f^hts
if those thou.n-hts are r;oing to take root and endure.
7. l-''elix H, Kirsch, Current iListor:'. -itMre for "-ermany?
p. 205.
(i
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Definitely?- as i^nportpnt as the liberalization of rrerman
education, the restitution of responsible political parties,
anci the reorientation of informational service is the per-
olexin^ problem of Germany's anchorless youth. Of all the
^-erman youths, those in the twenty to twenty-five year ao©- -
braci'iet present the most vexing stumblin'^ olocks, for the
members of this ^roup have been subjected since their tender-
est years to complete Nazi indoctrination and have been
stamped by the re?-imentation and rip-ors of German militc^ry
life.
Frau von Zahn-Harnach, civic leader in the American Zone
of '^erlin, has attempted to classify youth into three very
p-f^neral classifications. In her first c^roup are those '."/ho
are doing suitable work or are in schools, 'ihere are at
least two reasons for virorryinf? about the members of this
p-roup--overwork and malnutrition. Hliese youn^^- i^eople are
interested in political parties: but they fear the parties,
as do many C-ermacns , because m.embership in a party (Tazi)
has m.eant disaster and sufferine- for many Germans. The se-
cond rrroup is much larp-er and includes those not doinp; the
work they are interested in or preparing- for the professions
they wish. because many of the people in this rrroup are
performinri; ta^drs which they are cordially hatinp, the?^ ^re
executin'^ their ton Is badly and thus hindering reconstruction
'ihe girls have become acquainted with easier methods of
i
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earnin-^ a few ci'^^rettes or a mark or two. In ^'rau von
Zahn-4arnach' s third p:r>oup are those young people who have
no work at all and no desire to work. "THey are a rreat
moral and social danger; they spread diseases; many of
them are becoming criminals ... If we could <:'ive them suffi-
cient food and clothin'^', more than half of our youth problems
would be solved."!
In each Land there is a i.:inister of Cultural Affairs,
i
who is responsible for the work of youth coinmittees made /^of
adults active in the church, the local administration, the
trades, sports, etc. IVi.e iJinister and his staff are respon-
sible for counselin^-^ youth, mainly the 30-'^' who belonr^ to
some kind of a youth organization; for protecting youth or,*^-
1
anizations from subversive, nationalistic tendencies; for re-
jj
.r^isterin^' all youth units; and for insuring the direct con-
I
trol of all youth organizations by their constituted m.ember-
j
ships. In addition to this ^lerman organization, American
ij officers have been appointed by Mlitary (^rovernment to coop-
I erate with <^-erman youth officials to attain the goals of the
occupation. To encourage campinT, these officers were instru-
i
mental in assistinn; the ^rman officials to obtain two hun- :
dred tons of American military equipment and facilities to
;
be charp-ed to the Germany economy. "The grave danger is that
we shall assist materially to stren^p-then German organizations,
1. Weekly Information Bu.lletin , l:o. 95/^, 2 June I9L7, p. 6.
(
but wil] not succeed in inculcatin'^ a different set of ideals,
in this case, morally tenable ideals. These are difficult
to inculcate and the process takes tine,"^
Althou-'h iv.ilitary Government has discoui' j "r" \ 3 illa-
tion of youth organization'^, with political parties or poli-
tical programs, Hesse has allowed several youth or '^anizations
with definite political interests to form, as lonp- as there
was no definite political affiliation v/ith a party. Unfor-
tunately the '"-rowth of youth orp-.anizations with definite
political oropi^.nsi ties seei'^s not to be the result of spon-
taneous youth enthusiasms |but rather the result of consider-
able prodding by adult committees. Later, in the sprinr of
1qIl7, Military ^rovernment announced that the youth orp-aniza-
tion?? could be assisted by political parties, but not domina-
ted; however Liilitary G-overninent still opposes the indoc-
trination of youth under eirhteen years of a-^e by political
parties. ililitary ^rovernment has Drefer-'-'ed to encourage the
(^rov/th of non--'^ artisan grou^Ds and the cooper -^.tion of reli«
n-ious and political groups as a unit.
Hie famous Edelweiss-Piraten, who had been opposed to
ritler duriniT the Nazi re^-'i^ne, were quick to resume their
activities. ihis stronc:ly decentralized or<-''aniza tion is
not, however, cooperatinp- with ;-:ilitary Government, but on
the contrary is doinf^ every thinp- within its power to make
2, l^jorman E. Himes, Weekly Information bulletin, I'o. 96/9,
June 19Lt-7, p. 9»
(
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the position of I.Iilitary Governrient and the German authori-
ties untenable and ridiculous, by attempting many kinds of
harassin-^ actions.
The younger elements of German life constitute a major
problem, not political, but social. 'jhere are in th(^ Ameri-
can ^iione 300,000 children in foster homes, under guardian-
ships, or in correctional institutions. Children v^jho must
grow up without the many faceted comforts and feelings of
love and security concomitant with family life are o-oing to
avoid adulV. maladjustments only with supreme difficulty.
L'lilitary Government, it must be admitted, was extremely
slow to realize the magnitude of the youth '^roblera. Kot
until April 1
, 19h^ , were youth activites la^mched in the
American Zone, "^y April, I'phl t there were 7OOO youth ;^:roups
serving 390,000 youn^ people, of which liO',o of the total
belonp-ed to relifrious groups and 37> to sport enthusiasts'
groups
,
The yoi-' th of Germany, just as have Liany other German
elements, has made the incredible m.istake of associating true
democratic life with life under thie conditions of the occupa-
tion. The starvation, the low standard of living, the unem-
ployment-- these 9jid many more are considered by youth to be
the necessary evils to be suffered under democratic rule for
Germany. Llilitary Government and the German authorities have
so far failed to correct that false assumption. It is true
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th=)t many writers have mentioned the lar^^e nunber of con-
spiracies of youth a<3ainst the established Land governments;
hov/ever, tlie vast scale of iuvenile delinquency by o;angs that
profess to be ani'jt-fascis t" c seoins to be more a search for
food and exci te-nen t, ratier than political actions a'^ainst
fascism and the American forces.
Military Government must decide to consider vouth, not
as' public char,<3;es to be controlled and watched, but as instru-
m^ents to assist in the mouldin?r of a better '^-erman life.
Our failure to enlist the cooperation and the confidence of
''ernan youth is bound to produce either indifference to poli-
tical matters or a retreat into Ke6-Wazism, both of which
are extremely undesirable possibilities. The essence of
I'ilitary '^rovernment ' s failure, then, a-parently lia^in its
inability to replace Motional Socialist doctrines v/ith a
faith that will interest and challen^^e youth. In fact, ';'-er-
man youth distrusts democracy and v/hat it stand for; the
lon-^ years have produced a difficult- to-eradicate lethargy
and nihilism, A distrust of ever:^^t- *r ^ r-'^r r---rr.r n 'ra-
bility to trust anything or anybor' .
If Military 'rovernm'^nt carries through its projected
plan to grant an amjiesty to atl youths under twenty-seven
years of a,^e
,
many (^erman youn^: people may no longer feel
like outcasts and may then return mentally to the German
comm.unity to take their places as respon-'ible citizens. An
(i
1i
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amnesty ^ranted in December, 19li.6 , included those born after
January 11, 1919, who were neither i.:ajor Offenders nor Of fen-
ders, and certain disabled people v/ho were also neither Major
Offenders Vtor Offenders; Vn-.^vr-- ^"lere was a sixtjr-probation-
ary period to contend wi . ' neral amnesty could be
accompanied by an improvem.ent in economic conditions, then
a chance to reclaim, m.any of the "lost youths" would appear.
3
"'iliey (youths) have not found their way into a new philosophy
of life in a new political world... Vife cannot ram American
values down their throats when they don't want them.,.pMt we
can be ourselves, live these values, and represent them to
the (rermans, and J think it will pay very larp-e dividends."^
Unfortunately, however, American soldiers and civilians have
not lived the kind of life which Germ.an youth can emulate
with much advanta:;;e. Our representatives in '^rerraany have
often been 'greedy, loud, im.polite, and sexually a'--';p-ressive
,
Dr. Him.es feels that the bij7;^est needs of the youth pro-
c-ram as instituted are more training- for future 'j-erman leaders
in youth or '^anizations , more attention to rrirls ' youth organi-
zations, m.ore attempts to brin;7 German youths and youths from
foreir-n countries to^^ether, more opportunity for youths to
assume more important positions in the youth com-^lttees,
more success in luring university students from, their stron*^
3» Henrv J. Keller, The Present Status of G-erman Youth, De-
partment of State Publication 25^3, European Series II, pp. 3-6
Lj.. Weekly Information bulletin, ITo. 95/2, 2 June 191'?, p. 6,
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nationalistic tendencies, more and stron'-^er development of
trade union youth p-roups,which had been democratic bulv/arks
during the Weimar period, and the^ransla tion into German of
better youth literature of foreign democratic nations.
5
Until unemployment, lack of housin-;^;, the inflation, the
black market, and the lack of recreational facilities are
eliminated, there cannot be much hope of removin'^ boys from
criminal and anti-democratic actions and the 'j;irls from prosti-
tution. Until they have "decent hom.es, a normal environment,
and a hope for the future, "6 it is idle to consider the regen-
eration of '^-erman youth and the fashicnin?- of ''-erm.any into a
democracy.
j
5« Norman B. Himes, op, ci t , , p. 12.
6, Russell Uill, S tru n-^le for ''-erm.anv, ( Uew ^'^o-' '- ' f -^ 'r-^
Ipl-L?), p. 100.
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I!
efore attemptinp- to make a quantitative and qualitative
I
analysis of American I.Iilitary '"-overnrnen t' s achievements and
I
failures in Ter'any, T think that the marrnitude of Germany's
downfall must be emphasized. There can be lio doubt that the
Germany which wa^ed tv/o devastating technolo^'ical v/ars is
;
fini^'hed. It is true that the physical destruction of the
I
industrial plants can be repaired over a period of time;
[
however, the nearly six million loss of manpower; the loss
r of m.any leading; scientists to Russia, the United States, and
I ^'reat ^ri tain jprcbably fct^ever; the rapidly fallino- birth rate
combined with the heavy toll of disease which will reduce Ger-
m.any to a fifth-rate 'nation in size; the loss of the vast
C-erman "bread basket" in the East and the Saar industry in
j
the V/est: the reparation of C-ermany into two nations, a pro-
'. cess which is bein^" rapidly accomjlished at this time--these
ij are factors that will continue to debilitate G-ermany's power
i
I; of recuperation. '^-ermany is kaput--at least for many years
to come. As Winston Churchhill has said, "The task of hold-
inp: 'rermany down will not e - hnr or.'- — it v/ill r>-^ ^'iffl<
cult to hold her up."l
;
An important factor in t^rinf- I.Iilitary ^government's hands
in effee tuatinn- the State Department's policies for '"Germany
ij
is the overwhelm.lnp: fiasco, denazification. Denazification
is a prim.e exam.ple of our spendin-:: far too much time and
!• Quoted bv Custav StolDer, German Re all ties
,
{Tevi York,
10)|S), p. 22i.

effort on ne>Q;atlve asr.ects of our democratizing -orocess and
not enoun-h time ?.nd effort on affirmative, constructive meas-
ures. 'Then ^-eneral 'iisenJ-JO^ver sif^ned Public Law Ko. 3, the
law which set the denazification process into notion, he
said, "Reduced to its fundamentals, the United States entered
this war as a foe of I\azism; victory is not complete until we
have eliminated from positions of responsibility and, in at)-
propriate cases properl;^-^ punished, every active adherent to
the Nazi Party, Llilitary ^rovermient soon found the task
of denazification too difficult to handle, and so in keepin.g
with policy, the assip-nment was ';;:iven to the Germans them.-
selves in f arch gf loli6« "Jhe penalties for those convicted
were to range from two to ten years of forced labor on rep-
arations and reconstruction work and exclusion from public
office and disenfranchisement for those in the m.alor offender
class to paym.ents to a reparations fund by the followers.
Thus, for three years while this process has been Toing- on,
the Term.an nation has been held in a state of suspended ani-
mation, in a feeling of uncertainty and doubt. For instance,
as of the fall of If^'Liy , over eleven million cases of a possi-
ble ti';elve million persons had had their cases decided. Of
those eleven millions, nine m.illions were judr^ed not charge-
able '^nd fevo millions were '^iven amnesties, i.ost of the
million persons, whose cases have not yet been heard, comprise
2. Quoted fejr Julian "ach, Amer i c a ' 3 ^^ermany
,
(ITew York, 19[l6),
p. la'-L.
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the ^-ermans with Nazi affiliations, cases which will take a
lonp- period to dispose of,
iViany people cannot unders t^^ind v/hy public servants like
street car conductors, railroad employees, etc., have been re-
moved from their non-political jobs by tne elaborate denazifi-
cation, VnTiy not select people v/ho profited n-^eatly by the
r^azi re,f<ime and force them to bear the brunt of denazification?
Lord '^everidge has said, "Hie policy of de-Ivazif!ication
that we accepted in Potsdam is^a policy fit only for a totali-
tarian state. "3 Profes^-.or Liax Rheinstein of the University
of Chica<;;'o is quoted, "Our denazification methods are makin/r
martyrs out of inconsenuential little fellows, are hittinrr too
many wron.^ people, bar tlie void toward conversion of the for-
mer l.'azi who has learned his Desson, retard economic rehabili-
tation, thus prolong; starvation; i.e., the worst possible
climate for democracy,, and are drivin^r into sterile hatred
and resentful oorosition millions of people who mia-ht other-
v/ise have been sincere democrats,"U
Thus, in addition to the many other handicaps and short-
comings of American policies in '"Germany, Military '^'overnment
is tremendously restricted by a fanatical adherence to a com-
pletely impractical policy of denazification.
IVhat are the possibilities of nudginp the '^rermans into
3. Ferdinand A. Hermens, Forum, "Denazification or Renazifi-
cation?" November, IPil-?, Vol. CVIJI, p. PnP,
Max Hheinstein, the Con'-:ressional Record, Tarch 31, ipli?.
i
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the " : cr' Ic Can the policies of Military Government
be effected? It mast he said that much of the American State
Department policy for Germany formulated for I.'ilitary Govern-
-nent's promulgation is sincerely dedicated to the creation of
democracy in Cferinany; hov/ever the economic conditions,
coupled v;ith the un-healthy political climate created by l.azism
and pcst-v/ar defeat, leave the I'uture very viuch in doubt.
The Crerr.ans must be given their a^-ri cultural East if they
are .^join-- to solve the food problem and have the inclination
to think about democracy. The Germans must be p^iven an oppor-
tunity to rule themselves by rem.oving ^-ilitary Government from
tj
Germany, except for small demilitarization units and other
units to insure the inability of tlie Kazi:element to seize
power again. Hiis increase in authority for the Germ.an re-
presentatives v/111 increase their confidence in themselves,
will enable them to earn the respect of the Germ.an masses,
and will, above all, sharply curtail Military Goverrarxent ' s
intervention in purely Germ.an affairs. If the Germ.an authorl-
i
ties have real power, luaybe then they v/ill be willing and
desirous of supporting and fighting for democracy.
Ttie American Governjient is dedicated to the creation of
Yves tern Germ.any as a loose federation with power residing in
the IccP-l states, except for certain lim.lted powers given to
the central ^.overn-nent. As a loose federation of small
states, Germany made her greatest contributions to mankind;
i
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possibly, a loose federation for present-day G-ermany will
raiarantee the r;ro\vth of the local traditions and loyalties
triat can insure a peaceful future for the Gerrrans. If strong
local /j;ovorn-nient is to prosper, the political parties must
learn to cooperate as they have failed conspicuously to do in
the past. There must be a v/illinqne ss to "play the game"
\/ithin reasonable limits. Ilie parties must prove to the
voters that dem.ocratic life does not rtjean paralysis, inse-
curit^T', hunger, and frustration, that democracy and Christian-
ity v/orkinf: together can produce a fuller, happier life than
totalitarianism, v/hether fascistic or communistic, can effect,
i Democracy m.ust be shown as tcie way to open full opportunities
for all. If, hov/ever, the parties cannot win the full con-
fidence of the German people, then reeducation for democracy
I is a vain hope, as indeed it may be in any case. "lb become
1 fully effective as representative rovernment, dem.ocracy must
:i
cause its spirit of mutuality to run deep in the famiily, to
permeate the plavr^rounds of youth, to reach hi^h in the church
'I
.
-
^ and to informi the humblest processes of livelihood, "m-
Since Am.erica's G-erm.an3- is populated by women in a vast
majority (ten women for six men in the 20-LlO age group, and
ten women for seven men in the [1-O-6O age group), there is a
necessity that I'ilitary Government inaugurate and the German
I
authorities carry^out^a^pro^ Germ.an women
I
I
k. Report of the U.S, Education I.-ission to German:/-
,
Departm.ent
I
of State, Publication 2661(., European Series 16, p. 12,
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I that their interests should no lonrrer be restricted to the ||
,1
church, children, and the kitchen. They must be taur-ht an in- I
'1 teres t in democracy and its appurtenances; they must do better
\
I
than offer candidates for less than one percent of the public i
offices. C-erman \7onen have for too Irr ^ o^i'.c^ ^ t i.-'^or"'
their political ir.i!' la tur i ty
.
i! The youth of Germ.any must be drav/n into me democratic
|l circle as soon and as completely as possible, There >^iust be
jl chance for themi to form the disinherited and classless groups
I
in opposition to dem.ocratic ,?i-overnr'ent, as they did (that is,
;|
their fathers) .after IplS,
'I German newspapers must be furnished enou : - ./h : .v o.nd news-
p:' int to enable them^ to appear on the streets every day and
! in larr:e numbers. Outside materials from other countries
I
must be imported in ever-increasinr^- numbers. Ilie Gtermans
must be given an insirht to understand what democr-^^tic life
I resDlly means,
J It is tragic that as in 1915 the parties of dem.ocracy
have cone to po'./er amid the conditions of defeat and at the
^,
behest of tne occupiers, ^-'or that reason, the political par-
'l
ties must be offered as r::uch political autonomy as ^^ossible
and an opportunity to build strong democratic foundations as
the ". :arshall Plan assists in buildin,-T a stronger econoLiic
foundation for Germany, The parties must be m.ade strong if
i| they are to withstand the onslaughts of their opponents when
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the occupation is over. Ihe political pirties realize only
too v/ell that the present economic depression is breedinr: the
same dissa tisTac tions that led to Haaismin 1933. Thus, if
the parties can contribute stronp-ly and effectively to the re-
birth of Crermany from the present nadir, then they are bound
to be inestinably sti'^on'^er durin;' the ^^ears that lie ahead.
If democracy ^-e ts the benefit of better econonic conditions
and the assistance of rejuvenated trade unions and liberal
education, the r,iea':er, infinite smally sriall seed which Lili-
tary Government has planted to inculcate democratic feelinq:
into the G-erinan mind has a "fi^htinr chance" to Terminate and
grow, fertilized by the lonp-s tandin,g German reversion toward
the com_munistic solution, into a Germ.anized version of demo-
cratic living.
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